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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Russel Augustus ("Petitioner") was terminated from his job as a Vernal City 
Equipment Operator II on March 21, 2016. Vernal City Manager Ken Bassett 
("Bassett") effectuated the termination by issuing Petitioner a Notice of Disciplinary 
Action, wherein four different reasons or policy violations were noted. Petitioner 
appealed Bassett's decision to the Vernal City Appeals Board (the "Board"). The 
appeal was made pursuant to Utah Code Section 10-3-1106 and Section 12.06.010 
of the Vernal City Personnel Manual. 
The Board listened to the appeal at a hearing, which was conducted on May 
3, 2016. Testimony, evidence, and oral arguments were presented and received at . 
the hearing. Additionally, written briefs were submitted to the Board on specific 
subjects pertaining to the Petitioner's appeal. Upon deliberation, the Board affirmed 
Vernal City's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment; and issued Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order on June 29, 2016. 
The Board's decision to affirm Vernal City's termination of Petitioner's 
employment has been appealed by Petitioner, and is ripe for review by this Court. 
2. Statement of Facts 
For purposes of this brief, the Respondent, Vernal City accepts the factual 
findings of the Board; and includes in this "Statement of Facts" those that it believes 
to be the most pertinent parts of those factual findings. 
On January 21, 2016 Petitioner, and Michael Leigh (Leigh)--another Vernal 
City employee-- were assigned to place banners on poles on the west side of Vernal 
City, under the direction of Jeff Gardner (R.10, R.418:4-R-419:18.) During the work 
project, Petitioner and Leigh were operating a bucket truck owned by the city. 
(R.419:21-22.) 
Later in the morning, the bucket truck experienced mechanical problems and 
was returned to Vernal City's motor pool for repairs. (R.11, R.419:23-R.420:12.) 
While the bucket truck was being repaired, Petitioner drove a different city truck to 
the 1500 East Yard; reportedly to check on the repair of a water line. (R.33, 
R.420:25-R.421:1, R.474:7-10.) Leigh accompanied Petitioner and rode as a 
passenger in the truck. (R.420:25-R.421:1.) After lunch, Petitioner again took the 
buckettruck, with Leigh, fueled it, and then proceeded down 500 North. (R.14-R15.) 
Shortly after fueling the truck, Petitioner and Leigh deviated from their assigned 
work project by turning South onto 1500 East in order to drive by the 1500 East 
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Yard. (R.24, R78-79, R.422:19.) Neither Gardner or the Superintendent of Vernal 
City's Street Department, Mr. Allred ("Allred") gave Petitioner permission to depart 
from the assignment of placing banners on the west side of the city. (R.422:13-19.) 
Likewise, neither Petitioner's nor Leigh's work orders permitted them to divert city 
equipment to the other side of town. (R.418:21-25.) 
While driving the bucket truck past the 1500 East Yard, Petitioner further 
deviated from his assigned work project by using his city subsidized cell phone to 
take pictures/video record another city employee, BJ Partridge ("Partridge"). (R.79, 
R.422:4-22, R.573:7-R.574:10.) Partridge was testing a piece of city equipment at 
the 1500 East Yard, and was assigned to do so by Glade Allred. (R.20-21, R. 24.) 
Petitioner recorded Partridge with the phone while simultaneously driving the 
bucket truck. (R.266-67, R.370, R.422:4-12.) 
Allred first learned of Petitioner's deviation from his assigned work from a 
report made by Partridge. (R.422:4-12.). Partridge explained he had seen Petitioner 
and Leigh atthe 1500 East Yard. (R.422:4-12.). Partridge told Allred that Petitioner 
had used his cell phone to video record or to take pictures of him performing his 
work project. (R-422:4-12.) Allred decided to investigated the matter further by 
conducting interviews with Leigh and Petitioner. (R.6-42, R.44-69.) 
Allred first met with Leigh. (R-42, R.427:7-9.) Allred asked Leigh a series of 
questions relating to Leigh's and Petitioner's actions and whereabouts on January 
21. (R.6-42.) During the interview, Leigh stated to Allred that after refueling the 
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bucket truck he and Petitioner returned to the 1500 East Yard. (R.15.) He also 
admitted to Allred that while they were at the yard Petitioner used his cell phone to 
take pictures of Partridge operating a piece of city equipment. (R.16-17.) At the end 
of the meeting Allred placed Leigh on paid vacation leave, and told Leigh that he was 
going to get to the bottom of what occurred, and to call in the early morning to know 
whether or not to report for work the next day. (R. 36, R. 42, R.555.) . 
Allred next interviewed Petitioner. (R.426:12-R. 427:9.) Prior to the interview, 
Allred made three unsuccessful attempts to get in contact with Petitioner. 
(R-424:17-R.425:23.) First he attempted to reach Petitioner over the radio, but was 
unsuccessful due to an apparent malfunction. (R.423:8-R.424:20.) He then 
attempted twice to contact Petitioner on Petitioner's employer issued work phone. 
(R. 425:2-R.426:1.) These attempts too were of no avail. (R-426:2-4.) Ultimately, 
Allred reached Petitioner by running into him at the City's Public Works yard; at 
which time Allred explained to Petitioner that they needed to meet. 
(R:426: 12-R.427:9.) 
The interview with Petitioner took place at about 3:30pm. (R.427:7-9.) 
Throughout the course of the interview, Petitioner consistently exhibited an 
uncooperative, evasive and insubordinate attitude. (R.427:11-22.) This attitude was 
apparent from both his communications with Allred as well as his general demeanor. 
(R.43, R.44-69, R.427:11--R:431:10, R-443:9-22, R.696:9-R.697:7.) When Allred 
inquired as to why Petitioner did not answer his cell phone Petitioner stated that he 
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didn't have his cell phone, that his phone had been turned off all day, and that he 
didn't know where it was. (R.44, R. 68, R.426:25-R.427:4.) Despite this contention, 
it was later discovered that Petitioner had in fact used his phone three times that 
morning. (R.167, R.411:14-R.412:14, R-466:15-R-467:4.) 
After questioning Petitioner about his failure to answer his phone, Allred 
proceeded to ask a series of questions about Petitioner's work activities on January 
21, 2017, particularly about driving down to the 1500 East Yard and taking pictures 
of Partridge. (R.44-R.69.) Allred later reported that during this line of questi9ning 
Petitioner's answers became "very elusive and very vague". (R.443:9-20.) During the 
interview, Petitioner adamantly maintained that he could not remember ifhe had 
driven by the 1500 East Yard. (R.58, R.61, R.63, R.65, R.430:10-15, R.443:9-12.). 
Despite his lack of memory concerning this particular event, Petitioner had little to 
no difficulty recalling his whereabouts and activities earlier that same day. (R.53, 
R.55-57, R.65.) In a subsequent administrative proceeding, however, Petitioner 
admitted to driving back to the 1500 East Yard and taking pictures of Partridge. 
(R.570:9-18.) 
Allred also questioned Petitioner about taking pictures/making a video 
recording of Partridge. (R.65-R.66, R.68, R.430.) During this line of questioning 
Petitioner's again gave answers that were vague or evasive. (R.65, R.443.) Initially, 
during the interview with Allred, Petitioner feigned lack of memory as to the 
existence of the cell phone pictures/video. (R. 65-66, R.68.) Later, during the 
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hearing before the Board, Petitioner testified that he had in fact made a recording on 
his phone in order to document what he perceived as a safety concern with Partridge 
operating city equipment. (R.573:10-R.574:15, R.600:12-16.) However, the video 
was never turned over by Petitioner to city administration for review, and was viewed 
by city officials for the first time at the Board hearing. (R.574:22-23, R.600:12-21.) 
Allred also asked several times during the interview for Petitioner to make his 
phone available; so that he could check it for pictures and/or video. (R.66-67, 
R.444:17-21.) Allred reminded Petitioner that Petitioner signed an agreement with 
Vernal City that required him to make information on his phone available to the City 
upon request. (R.66; R.43019-23; See R. 71,72, R.73, R.177.) Petitioner was 
uncooperative with this request. (R.66-67, R.430:23-R.431-3.) Ultimately, Petitioner 
got defensive and refused to hand over his phone stating, "[y ]ou're not touching my 
phone, [Allred]". (R.66, R.444.) 
Around 4:00pm the investigative interview came to a premature end when 
Petitioner indicated to Allred that his work shift was over and that he was going to 
leave. (R.68, R.431:3.) Allred explained to Petitioner that he couldn't leave until he 
was finished asking questions. (R.68, R.431:2-10.) Allred admonished Petitioner 
that leaving the meeting was insubordination, and that he would be placing himself 
at risk of administrative action, up to and including possible termination. (R.69, 
R-431:7-9.) In direct opposition to his supervisor's authority, Petitioner left the 
interview. (R.431:9-10.) As he was leaving, and in response to Allred's 
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admonishment, Petitioner retorted, "Have fun with that." (R.69, R.431:10.) 
After the interview, Allred, in accordance with city policy, placed Petitioner 
on paid vacation. (R. 712:13-21.) Later that evening, upon further investigation and 
reflection, Allred determined that it was in the best interest of the City that both 
Petitioner and Leigh not be permitted to return to work before the first of next week. 
(R.340, R.709:16-19.) Allred later testified that the City's interest was allowing City 
administrator's additional time to investigate Petitioner's suspected employee policy 
violations, while also allowing Petitioner time to cool off. (R.711:21-R.712:7, 
R.713:3-7.) Petitioner remained off duty on paid vacation leave until January 29, 
2017, at which time City Manager Basset placed him on administrative leave. (R.3.) 
A pre-disciplinary hearing was held on March 4, 2016. (R.74.) Petitioner was 
given notice of the pre-disciplinary hearing on J anua:ry 29, 2016. (R.1-4.) The notice 
contained four reasons for potential disciplinary action against Petitioner, all of 
which pertained to the January 21 incident, and Petitioner's behavior during his 
interview with Allred. (R.1.) The four reasons were as follows: 
(1) Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties; 
misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property of any 
employee; and deliberately restricting output; 
(2) Act of Dishonesty related to job performance; 
(3) Displaying insubordinate behavior; and 
(4) A [v]iolation of ... City Personnel Policies or Procedures, ... (Not 
7 
having your cell phone available as required by the cellphone use agreement dated 
April 22, 2103) and cell phone policy of the City; and 12.05.030 (W) Act of 
Dishonesty related to job performance. 
(R.1.) 
Petitioner was present at the pre-disciplinary hearing along with his attorney, 
Christian Kesselring. (R.74.) The Citywas represented by Mike Harrington. (R.74.) 
During the hearing witnesses testified and Petitioner had an opportunity to present 
his response to the issues raised bythepre-disciplinaryhearingnotice. (R.74-R.110.) 
On March 21, 2016, following the hearing, City Manager Bassett issued a Notice of 
Disciplinary Action to Petitioner, terminating his employment with Vernal City. 
(R.179-R.184.) The Notice of Disciplinary Action identified specific misconduct by 
Petitioner which justified his termination. (R.180-R.183.) 
Regarding reason (1), "Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform 
assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property 
of any employee; deliberately restricting output", the Notice specified that Petitioner 
failed to satisfactorily perform his duties when he decided to deviate from his 
assigned work project and go to the 1500 East yard and take pictures of Partridge. 
(R.180-R.181.) In addition, he used the bucket truck for a purpose that was 
unrelated to his job duties. (R.180-R.181.) Finally, Petitioner's deliberate act of 
taking Leigh away from his duties to ride to the 1500 East yard deliberately 
restricted work output. (R.180-R.181.) 
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Regarding reason (2) "Dishonesty related to job performance", the Notice 
specified that termination was warranted because, based on testimony, Petitioner 
was disingenuous when he told Allred that he couldn't remember going to the 1500 
East yard or taking photographs or videos. (R.181.) 
Regarding reason (3) "Insubordination", the Notice specified that termination 
was warranted because Petitioner left the January 25th meeting after being directed 
to stay, and being admonished that leaving would constitute insubordination. 
(R.182.) 
Finally, regarding reason (4) "Violation of city personnel policies or 
procedures" the Notice specified that termination was warranted because Petitioner 
did not have his cell phone available as required by the cell phone use agreement 
dated April 22, 2013, the cell phone policy of the City, and also for not answering 
Allred's calls. (R.182-R.183.) Additionally, Petitioner lied about having access to his 
cell phone when he stated twice "I haven't had my cell phone," and "my phone has 
been off all day", when in reality he had used it earlier that day while on duty. 
(R.182-R.183.) 
The decision to terminate Petitioner's employment was subsequently 
re-examined in a hearing before the Board. (R.386-R.773.) Petitioner was 
represented by counsel during the hearing and so was Vernal City. (R.392:1-13.) 
During the hearing, the Board heard the testimony of witnesses and reviewed 
exhibits and other pieces of evidence. (R.386-R. 773.) In addition, counsel submitted 
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briefs on specific issues raised at the hearing. (R. 771; See R.374-376.). The primary 
issues that required briefing were; (i) whether the meeting between Allred and 
Petitioner was a disciplinary proceeding, requiring due process before requiring 
Petitioner to take paid vacation, and; (ii) if it was not a disciplinary proceeding, did 
Allred act with lawful authority in requiring Petitioner to stay in the January 25th 
meeting. (R.771; See R.374-376.). 
Upon deliberation, the Board unanimously affirmed Vernal City's decision 
to terminate Petitioner's employment. (R.380-381.). In support of its decision, the 
Board made detailed findings with regards to each of the four reasons for 
termination, and the issues presented by counsel in their briefs. (R.368-377.) 
Concerning reason (1) "Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform 
assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property 
of any employee; deliberately restricting output" the Board found and concluded in 
pertinent part as follows: 
1. On January 21, 2016 [Petitioner] was assigned to place banners on poles 
on the west side of the city ... 
3. After lunch [Petitioner] took the bucket truck with Mr. Michael Leigh, 
... and then proceeded down 500 North, turning South on 1500 East to pass by the 
1500 East Yard .... There is no evidence that Mr. Gardner or Mr. Allred approved 
diverting equipment and personnel from the west side of town to the east side of 
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town. 
4. [The] real reason for the diversion was that the [Petitioner] desired to 
drive by the 1500 East Yard to video another city employee ... 
5. The video was taken using [Petitioner's] cell phone, which is a city 
subsidized cell phone, and as such is subject to city cell phone policy. 
6. It appears from the video that [Petitioner] introduced at the hearing, 
that [he] was driving the city bucket truck while videoing with his cell phone, which 
is an unsafe and illegal practice. During the meeting between Petitioner and Mr. 
Allred on January 25, Petitioner refused to answer questions about where he took the 
bucket truck after lunch and claimed several times that he returned to the west side 
of the city to work on banners as he had been assigned. In subsequent proceedings, 
[Petitioner] admitted that this was not true. 
9. Petitioner's claims about the reason for his taking the video lack 
credibility for at least the following reasons: 
a. If he was concerned about safety of persons or equipment he 
should have immediately provided the video to Mr. Allred or to Allen Parker or Ken 
Bassett, which he did not do and in fact refused to provide the video; 
b. He was evasive and untruthful about having taken the video, and 
the purposes of the video; it appears from the video that was provided that he was 
driving by the yard while taking the video rather than stopping in a safe manner to 
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take the video and reporting his concerns immediately to appropriate city officials; 
c. He failed and refused to provide the video to his supervisor when 
directly requested to do so, and claimed during the meeting that he did not have his 
cell phone and did not know where it was, which is a violation of city policy. 
12. [Petitioner's] conduct wasted city resources and placed the city at risk 
and was contrary to his assigned work area. 
(R.368-370.) 
Concerning reason (2), "Dishonesty related to job performance", the Board 
found and concluded in pertinent part as follows: 
1. [Petitioner] was dishonest in his statements and explanations 
concerning his activities on January 21, 2015, including the reason for taking the city 
bucket truck and another city employee to 1500 East and in his stated reasons for 
videoing Mr. Partridge. 
2. [Petitioner] refused to acknowledge videoing a fellow city employee 
operating a piece of city equipment, was evasive, and avoided or refused to answer 
direct questions concerning the incident. 
3. [Petitioner] stated that he would provide a copy of the video when he 
finally acknowledged that he had it, which he failed to do. 
4. [Petitioner] falsely stated that his concern was the safety of an employee 
or equipment which, ... lacks any credibility. 
12 
5. At the hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board observed Petitioner, 
both while he was testifying and when he was not testifying, and finds that his 
answers to questions propounded by the attorney for the city were evasive, that his 
demeanor evidenced lack of truthfulness, and that based upon his actions and 
statements in the recorded conversation with his supervisor and his testimony at the 
hearing it is difficult to afford any degree of credibility to the statements made by 
[Petitioner]. 
6. [There] is substantial evidence to support the finding that [Petitioner] 
was dishonest: 
a. [Petitioner] stated that he could not remember or had not gone 
by the 1500 East Yard; 
b. [Petitioner] claimed that he had returned to work putting up 
banners on the west side of the city, traveling along 100 North; 
c. [Petitioner] claimed that he did not have his telephone when Mr. 
Allred attempted to contact him on January 25; 
d. [Petitioner] stated that his purpose in going by the 1500 East yard 
was solely to fix banners on the East side of the city. 
e. When questioned during his meeting with his supervisor and at 
the hearing about matters that he did not want to admit to or discuss, Petitioner was 
deceptive and claimed he couldn't remember, yet on the same dates he appeared to 
have a very vivid recollection when it served his interests; 
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g. Petitioner changed his story repeatedly, and omitted facts and 
feigned lack of memory. Petitioner also made misleading statements about his use 
of city equipment and about the video, and made dishonest statements about taking 
the video and about the purpose of the video. 
(R.370-371.) 
Concerning reason (3) "Insubordination" the Board found and concluded as 
follows: 
1. There [ was] more than substantial evidence to show that [Petitioner] 
was insubordinate throughout the meeting with his supervisor. 
2. [Petitioner's] general tone of voice, attitude, tapping of a marker on the 
table, and refusal and failure to answer questions honestly and directly demonstrated 
a lack of respect for his supervisor. 
3. [Petitioner] was evasive, refused to answer questions, was disrespectful, 
ordered the supervisor to 'move on' after evading questions, cursed, and ultimately 
walked out of the meeting after being specifically and clearly directed by his 
supervisor to remain in the meeting. Moreover, he did walk out after being advised 
that refusal to remain in the meeting would be considered insubordination and may 
result in his termination. 
4. [Ausugusts'] disrespectful retort as he left the meeting 'good luck with 
that' further illustrates a series of disrespectful and insubordinate statements and 
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conduct by [Petitioner] during that meeting toward his supervisor, which is 
illustrated to some degree by the transcript but more forcefully by the audio 
recording of the meeting. 
5. The Board is convinced that the purpose of [Petitioner's] video on the 
east side of the city on January 21, when he was assigned to work on the west side of 
the city, was not motivated by a safety concern but rather was an effort to undermine 
and get information to damage his department head. 
6. Petitioner's attitude during the meeting with Mr. Allred was 
insubordinate, confrontational, dishonest, and disrespectful. 
7. At no time following that meeting did [Petitioner] make any effort to 
apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any willingness or desire to work 
cooperatively with his supervisor or make any effort to resolve any concerns or 
differences. 
8. Had [Petitioner's] attitude following that meeting up to and through the 
hearing before the Board been different or more cooperative or upfront and honest 
the result might well have been different. Instead [Petitioner] has remained defiant, 
aggressive and dishonest. 
9. In the meeting with Mr.Allred, [Petitioner] was requested at least twice 
to provide a copy of the video that he took while driving the city truck, yet he did not 
provide that until played for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals Board. 
During his testimony before the Appeals Board he claimed no one asked for the video 
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which is a clear act of dishonesty and false statement under oath before the Appeals 
Board, as shown by the audio recording and transcription of that meeting. 
10. From all of the evidence, including the transcripts and recording of the 
interview with his supervisor through the hearing before the Appeals Board, the 
Board finds that Petitioner's actions have been targeted towards undermining his 
supervisor so that he could take over the Department. 
11. Petitioner's statements about his not having his phone available when 
his supervisor was attempting to contact him are untruthful and also insubordinate. 
It is clear that he had his telephone available since he made use of it, yet he failed to 
answer calls from his supervisor or to return calls that had been made to him. 
12. [Petitioner] was untruthful in claiming that his texts with Sherri 
Montgomery were during his break since the time line of those texts demonstrates 
a period in excess of a normal break. 
13. [Petitioner] is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing to admit his 
activities, lying about his activities, and failing to acknowledge his fault and 
misconduct when he made a mistake. His attitude throughout has been to cast 
blame on others but not to take any responsibility himself. 
14. The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only demonstrated by the 
transcripts and recordings prior to the hearing, but the Board notes, his facial 
expressions, demeanor and behavior at the hearing when answering questions 
regarding the events and during the testimony of Mr. Allred including smirking, 
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rolling his eyes and other conduct and expressions further confirms a lack of respect 
and an insubordinate attitude. 
15. A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect was also 
demonstrated and observed by the Board during the hearing. During the testimony 
of Mr. Bassett, Petitioner was observed to glare at the witness and rolled his eyes, 
and acted in a hostile and disrespectful manner. 
16. The Vernal City Road Department is a fairly small department with a 
limited number of employees. The actions of Petitioner show that he is not amenable 
to supervision and cannot work there under the direction of the department head, 
Mr. Allred. This results in part from his insubordination and his dishonesty in 
dealing with his department head and with others and from the fact that he has not 
made any effort to resolve the issues or acknowledge his misconduct. Even at the 
hearing it was apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful attitude, and has no 
willingness to acknowledge his own errors. Any discipline less than termination 
would not bring about needed change ... 
(R.371-373.) 
Concerning reason (4), "Violation of city personnel policies or procedures, 
including the cell phone policy", the Board found and concluded in pertinent part as 
follows: 
1. There is substantial evidence that [Petitioner] violated the City's cell 
phone policies and procedures as indicated in the Notice of Disciplinary Action ... 
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The City Manager did not abuse his discretion in finding violations of the personnel 
policies including cell phone policy. 
(R.373-374.) 
Finally, concerning the issues raised in counsels' brief to the Board, the Board 
made the following general findings: 
1. A supervisor has the right and the responsibility to look into concerns 
that arise about an employee and to investigate. That investigation may include 
interviewing or questioning the employee or other witnesses. Such a meeting is part 
of the supervisory responsibility of the supervisor or department head, and is not a 
pre-discipline hearing, even if the supervisor has outlined a list of questions or issues 
of concern priorto the meeting. Meeting with [Petitioner] to give him an opportunity 
to explain what had transpired on January 21 was proper ... 
2. According to [Petitioner's] brief both Mr. Leigh and Petitioner were 
questioned by their supervisor on January 25th about the same incidents and both 
were instructed to take some paid vacation time. Apparently Mr. Leigh responded 
differently to the meeting with his supervisor than Petitioner such that he was not 
terminated. As outlined above, Petitioner's attitude and behavior took him down an 
entirely different road. 
The Board then went into detailed findings regarding the two primary issues 
argued in the parties' briefs. 
4. Authority to Issue Order. 
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a. [Petitioner] has not provided any substantial evidence that Mr. Allred did 
not have proper authority to direct him to remain at the meeting. It is within the 
inherent authority of a supervisor to inquire into issues of concern relating to an 
employee and to request information from the employee as part of that process. The 
nature of the work for which [Petitioner] is employed frequently requires work 
beyond a specific quitting time. 
c. [Allred] did not order Petitioner to remain in the meeting for the purpose 
of providing "a foot massage" but rather in an attempt to pierce the intransigent 
refusal of [Petitioner] to honestly and directly answer questions propounded by his 
supervisor. 
d. The Board believes that is a proper exercise of supervisory responsibility 
and authority. 
5. Paid Vacation Time. 
a. Testimony at the hearing shows that the policy and long-standing practice 
at the city has been that department heads may, under appropriate circumstances, 
require an employee to take several days of vacation. This may be to allow the 
employee to deal with personal issues, or it may be to allow an employee time to cool 
off or settle down. That is paid time off. The direction to Petitioner to take vacation 
time was consistent with that policy and practice. In light of the behavior and 
attitude of the Appellant, Petitioner, the direction to take some paid vacation time 
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was advisable, and was not an abuse of discretion nor did it exceed the authority of 
the supervisor. 
b. The application and imposition of paid vacation time was allowed pursuant 
to city policies section 5.01.010 and action 5.01.060, including the provision that "as 
he deems necessary, a department head may require an employee to use any accrued 
vacation leave." The application and interpretation of that policy by the department 
head and the city manager is consistent with long-standing application and 
interpretation of that policy, and [Petitioner] did not present any substantial 
evidence to the contrary. 
Finally, the Board revisited the issue of insubordination by making additional 
findings which supported the Board's previous conclusion that Petitioner was 
properly terminated for insubordination. Many of these findings also address the 
Boards' perception of Petitioner's credibility as a witness. 
a. The Board finds that Petitioner's behavior, statements, and actions 
demonstrate that when he ignored the directions to help finish installing banners on 
the west side of the city and instead drove the city bucket truck and another city 
employee to the east side of the city and passed the yard while taking video with his 
city subsidized phone, his intent was to undermine his department head, Mr. Allred. 
The video that he took of another employee operating the city equipment, which was 
provided for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals Board demonstrates that 
he was unsafely operating the city bucket truck by videoing while driving, and it 
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appears that he had planned in advance to take the video and had manipulated his 
phone while driving and prior to reaching the yard. 
c. In fact, Petitioner went out of his way to avoid admitting that he had taken 
the video during his meeting with his supervisor and failed and refused in spite of 
repeated requests to provide the video taken on the city subsidized cell phone. In so 
doing he violated city policy and contradicted any argument that he undertook that 
activity for a legitimate purpose. When interviewed days later aboutthe events on the 
day that Petitioner took the video with his cell phone, he claimed no memory of that 
particular event but had good recall of the other events of that same day. If he had 
a legitimate concern about safety issues, it is not credible to believe that he would 
remember other insignificant events of the day but lack recall as to that matter. 
d. During the interview with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was evasive and 
defensive and aggressive when questioned on those matters. 
e. During his testimony before the hearing Board when questioned by 
opposing counsel about those matters he once again reacted in an evasive, 
confrontational manner. 
g. The events from January 21, 2016, and the attitude and behavior of the 
Appellant from that time through the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrate more interest in undermining his supervisor and no evidence 
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whatsoever of any effort or desire to work cooperatively within the Department 
structure or chain of command. 
h. The Appellant's attitude, nonverbal displays, and facial expressions during 
the hearing on the stand were disturbing and pronounced and reflect an attitude, 
disrespect, and a disregard for truth. 
i. The Appellant's statement as he left the meeting with his supervisor in 
blatant disregard of the instruction that he remain at the meeting - the comment 
"good luck with that" - is consistent with the attitude and actions displayed at the 
evidentiary hearing before the Board. The "good luck with that" attitude which 
remains unchanged shows that he cannot work effectively under the supervision of 
the road department head, and that his continuing presence there and insolent 
attitude would be disruptive to the good order and efficient operation of the entire 
department. 
j. Had the Appellant at any time prior to the pre-disciplinary hearing or even 
during the evidentiary hearing demonstrated through his words and demeanor and 
behavior any change of attitude, recognition of his misconduct, any desire to mend 
fences and work cooperatively with his supervisor and within the structure of the 
department as a positive productive employee the outcome might well be different. 
(R.374-376.) 
Based on these findings, the Board concluded that Vernal City' decision to 
terminate Petitioner was supported by the weight of the evidence; that Allred 
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exercised appropriate supervisory authority, and that City Manager Bassett did not 
abuse his discretion or act in a arbitrary or capricious manner in deciding to 
terminate Petitioner's employment. (R.378-380.) Thus, the unanimous decision of 
the Board was that termination of Petitioner was warranted, and the order to 
terminate Petitioner's employment was sustained. (R.381.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's initial argument is that Petitioner's supervisor allegedly violated 
the law in his meeting with Petitioner to investigate wrongdoings on Petitioner's 
part. This argument does not have any basis in law or fact. Petitioner's other 
argument is that the decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed because the 
Appeals Board allegedly considered facts outside the scope of the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action. This argument should also fail because the argument is 
inadequately briefed, the Appeals Board considered only matters sufficiently related 
to the several bases for termination described in the Notice of Disciplinary Action, 
and/ or any error on the part of the Appeals Board was harmless error as the decision 
of the Appeals Board was supported by substantial evidence. In the end, Petitioner's 
termination should be upheld because the Vernal City Appeals Board did not abuse 
its discretion in upholding the City Manager's decision to terminate Petitioner. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S SUPERVISOR ACTED WITHIN APPROPRIATE 
AUTHORITY DURING HIS INTERACTION WITH PETITIONER AT THE 
JANUARY 25, 2016 MEETING. 
When Petitioner's supervisorwith Vernal City(GladeAllred, hereafter referred 
to as the "Supervisor") had become aware of Petitioner's possible violations of Vernal 
City policy, the Supervisor called a meeting with Petitioner to discuss the concerns 
and investigate the matter. Upon meeting with Petitioner to review the allegations 
of misconduct, and finding Petitioner to be extremely angry and aggressive, the 
supervisor decided to place Petitioner on paid leave in order to allow Petitioner to 
calm down from his irate state of mind so that he could return to work mentally 
healthy and productive, which decision was appropriate and cannot constitute 
formal discipline. Regardless, Petitioner's insubordinate behavior during the 
meeting cannot be simply ignored because of an alleged due process violation. 
A. The Supervisor's Decision to Place Petitioner on Paid Vacation Was 
Appropriate and Cannot Constitute Formal Discipline. 
1. The purpose of the January 25 meeting was investigatory rather than 
disciplinary. 
Under Section 12.05.040 of the Vernal City Personnel Manual, formal 
proceedings for discipline are to take place only after the Department Head and the 
City Manager have met to discuss the matter of alleged employee misconduct. Such 
an event prior to formal discipline implies a requirement for the Department Head 
to investigate any alleged matter of employee misconduct before consulting with the 
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City Manager. As such, before meeting with the City Manager, the Department Head 
is tasked with interviewing witnesses to alleged misconduct as well as reviewing any 
available documentation associated with the alleged misconduct. Additionally, there 
is nothing in the Vernal City Personnel Manual that in any way prohibits the 
Department Head from conducting such an investigation of alleged misconduct. If 
the Department Head and the City Manager so decide, based on the facts discovered 
by the Department Head, formal discipline may proceed in accordance with the 
Personnel Manual. Id. 
In this case, the Supervisor, a department head within Vernal City, had 
received allegations of misconduct against Petitioner Russel Augustus, an employee 
of Vernal City under Mr. Allred's supervision. As seen from the findings of the 
Appeals Board, which considered among other things the transcript of the January 
25 meeting, the audio recording of the meeting, and the testimony at the appeals 
hearing, nothing within the meeting at issue was anything more than a supervisor 
lawfully acting as the department head to investigate the allegations against an 
employee. The Appeals Board specifically found, "The meeting between Mr. Allred 
and Mr. Augustus was an appropriate exercise of supervisory responsibility by Mr. 
Allred and did not require the formalities appropriate for a predisciplinary hearing." 
R.379. 
2. The City is allowed to place employees on paid vacation in order to 
establish a healthy and productive work force. 
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Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.010 states, "The purpose of annual 
vacation leave is to allow an employee time to both mentally and physically refresh 
himself in order that he be better able to carry out the duties of his work." There is 
nothing in the policy that implies that vacation is only to be taken when the 
employee chooses. In fact, under the section dealing with scheduling vacation leave, 
Section 5.01.060, it states, "As he deems necessary, a Department Head may require 
an employee to use any accrued vacation leave." Furthermore, under Vernal City 
Personnel Manual Section 12.05.065, a requested use of vacation time is not 
classified as a disciplinary action, nor is such a request discussed at any place in the 
Personnel Manual in the context of discipline. 
After the meeting took place between Petitioner and his supervisor, on the 
afternoon of January 25, 2016, the supervisor requested Petitioner to leave work and 
to use Petitioner's vacation time in the process. At the hearing before the Appeals 
Board, testimony was presented that Petitioner had become "heated" and unable to 
behave properly or carry out the duties of his work, thereby making it necessary to 
mentally and physically refresh himself. R.427-431, 4 73. Furthermore, the 
supervisor used his discretion as a department head, as given him under Vernal City 
policy described above, when making that request. 
3. The request to use vacation time was not formal discipline. 
Under Vernal City policy described above, and according to testimony given, the 
order was not disciplinary in nature, but rather with any eye toward rehabilitating 
26 
an employee while Vernal City administration considered an appropriate course of 
action. There is no Utah law contradicting these Vernal City policies. Therefore, the 
meeting was lawful, and was not disciplinary in nature. 
There is no evidence that any specific discipline had been decided ahead of 
time. As testified by the Supervisor, any notes prepared beforehand were the 
supervisor's attempt to prepare for possible avenues of action after the interviewing 
the witnesses and reviewing supporting documentation. R.698. He was merely 
making notes regarding his options when he listed a possibility of "No paid time." 
Furthermore, a plain reading of that phrase has nothing to do with paid vacation. 
4. The issue of whether Petitioner's supervisor could lawfully request that 
Petitioner stay at the January 25 meeting was not adequately briefed. 
The title of Section 1 of Petitioner's Brief asserts, "The Appeals Board 
committed reversible error when it concluded that Petitioner's supervisor acted 
within his authority by ordering Petitioner to stay in the January 25 meeting." 
Petitioner's Brief at p. 20. Outside of this very general statement, Petitioner fails to 
present any discussion whatsoever in support of the argument that the supervisor 
lacked lawful authority to request that Petitioner remain in the investigatory 
meeting. Petitioner only makes the argument that the meeting with the supervisor 
was an unlawful predisciplinary hearing in nature, without any argument as to why 
that circumstance would prevent a supervisor from demanding that his employee 
remain in that meeting, which by all accounts was still a business-related meeting 
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requested by the supervisor. See, generally, Petitioner's Brief at Section 1, pp. 20-26. 
Therefore, the issue of whether or not Petitioner's supervisor had lawful authority 
to make such a request to stay is not at issue and does not need to be addressed. 
Furthermore, Petitioner requests in his "Conclusion" that the Court remand 
this matter to determine whether termination was warranted, but to make that 
determination "in the absence of insubordination," and hinges that request on the 
argument that if the supervisor lacked authority to demand that Petitioner not leave 
the meeting, then it cannot be insubordination to have done so. See Petitioner's 
Brief at pp. 20-21, 28. Therefore, where Petitioner's Brief is bereft of discussion or 
argument regarding the supervisor's authority to demand that Petitioner stay, the 
Court should accept the Appeal Board's determination that Petitioner's leaving the 
meeting against the request of his supervisor was an act of insubordination. But as 
discussed below, even if the January 25 meeting is in some way found to be 
inappropriate in nature, that does not excuse Petitioner's behavior during the 
meeting. 
B. Petitioner Was Insubordinate During the January 25 Meeting, 
Which Behavior Cannot Be Excused Regardless of "Whether 
Directed Paid Vacation Is Considered Disciplinary in Nature. 
1. Petitioner was insubordinate. 
It is undisputed that insubordination is a terminable offense under Vernal City 
policy and Utah State law. Respondents accept Petitioner's definition of 
insubordination as one possible demonstration of insubordinate behavior that is 
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worthy of formal discipline; Respondents agree that an employee may not disobey 
a reasonable and lawfully-given direction from a superior. 
Utah law includes some additional direction as to what may constitute 
insubordination. Under the administrative code describing examples of just cause 
bases for discharge of employment, it addresses insubordination as follows: 
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be 
followed; reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be 
obeyed; supervisors will be respected and their authority will not be 
undermined. In determining when insubordination becomes 
disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and 
legitimate interests is of major importance. Protesting or expressing 
general dissatisfaction without an overt act is not a disregard of the 
employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a superior or 
vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may constitute 
insubordination if it disrupts routine, undermines authority or impairs 
efficiency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic insistence or discussion by 
a claimant, acting in good faith, is not disqualifying conduct. 
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208; see also Dinger v. Department of Workforce 
Services, Workforce Appeals Bd., 2013 UT App 59, ,I16, 300 P.3d 313 .1 
Additionally, as Petitioner has pointed out, Vernal City has not defined the 
term "insubordination" within its policies. It follows that the City Manager and the 
Vernal City Appeals Board should be given broad discretion to identify acts of 
insubordination within the common usage of the word. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Utah case law supports the notion that 
'Though this is in the context of just cause termination which would deny a terminated 
employee of unemployment insurance funds, the policies outlined by Code function as a 
persuasive description of how allegations of insubordination should be analyzed in all State 
employment contexts. 
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termination may be appropriate in the case of insubordination. See, generally, 
Dinger, 2013 UT App 59, 300 P.3d 313; Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App 51, 
230 P.3d 1032. 
In this case it is undisputed that during the January 25 meeting between 
Petitioner and his supervisor, Petitioner was gently instructed not to leave the 
meeting, and that leaving would constitute insubordination. The supervisor's 
instruction was lawful. Petitioner instead walked out, casually disrespecting the 
supervisor's threat of discipline, retorting, "Good luck with that." 
2. Even if, arquendo, Petitioner's supervisor's direction to take paid 
vacation transformed the January 25 meeting into an unlawful 
disciplinary hearing, Petitioner had no right to act insubordinately. 
As described above, Respondents assert that the January 25 meeting was 
appropriately held and Petitioner's supervisor acted within appropriate authority. 
However, even if this Court determines that the meeting was disciplinary in nature, 
that cannot excuse Petitioner's insubordinate behavior. 
Petitioner's argument is essentially that Petitioner's outrageous behavior 
toward his superior should be excused because the meeting itself resulted in an 
allegedly unlawful disciplinary hearing. However, an employee's insubordinate 
behavior toward a superior may not be overlooked because of a technical reading of 
vacation policy. Even if the supervisor had actually unlawfully issued disciplinary 
measures to Petitioner during the January 25 meeting, there is nothing in the law 
that would allow Petitioner to leave a properly called business-related meeting 
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against his superior's requests that he remain. The instruction to remain and discuss 
the allegations was reasonable. The supervisor's requests were given civilly and 
respectfully. The supervisor had a rightful and legitimate authority to investigate the 
matter without Petitioner leaving the meeting. 
Furthermore, and in contrast, Petitioner did not have the right to act in the 
manner in which he conducted himself at the meeting. As presented at the hearing, 
he was disrespectful, undermining, and provoking. Therefore, even if the ordered 
leave on paid vacation was unlawful to any degree, Petitioner's insubordinate 
behavior, particularly in leaving the meeting, was not excusable. 
II. THE APPEAIS BOARD COMMITIED NO DUE PROCESS ERROR IN 
ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN FAVOR OF 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION. 
A. Petitioner's Argument That the Appeals Board Considered 
Evidence Outside the Scope of the Notice of Disciplinary Action Is 
Inadequately Briefed. 
" [T]o be adequate, briefs must provide meaningful legal analysis. An adequate 
brief is one that fully identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal 
authority. Mere bald citation to authority, devoid of any analysis, is not adequate. 
And we may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." State v. 
Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,I 22, 128 P.3d 1179 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). In his brief at part 2, Petitioner makes 
a general allegation that the Appeals Board relied on evidence outside the scope of 
the Notice of Disciplinary Action in justifying Petitioner's termination. However, 
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Petitioner sites to no specific instances of misconduct, alleged to have been 
considered by the Appeals Board, that are outside the Notice of Disciplinary Action. 
Petitioner's brief merely cites to authority and contains no meaningful analysis of 
how that authority applies to the case at hand, making it impossible for Respondent 
herein to be able to fully respond to the argument. Furthermore, in part 2.3 of his 
brief, Petitioner makes another general allegation that Petitioner was harmed by 
being deprived of a fair hearing and that the entire process was biased against him, 
again without citing to any specific instances of due process violations, and failing 
to cite to any law. Therefore, part 2 of Petitioner's brief is inadequately briefed, and 
therefore should not be considered by this Court. 
The response below is Respondent's best attempt to discern Petitioner's 
argument and demonstrate that the argument should fail regardless. 
B. Petitioner Was Given Adequate Notice of the Bases for Termination 
Prior to the Hearing Before the Appeals Board, and the Appeals 
Board Relied on Those Bases in Upholding Petitioner's 
Termination. 
"The statutory scheme that describes the process for appealing a termination 
decision to a municipal appeal board requires that the city provide notice of the 
grounds for termination so that an employee can meaningfully evaluate whether an 
appeal is likely to be productive and what information will be considered by the 
board." Fierro v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2012 UT App 304, ,i 13, 295 P.3d 696. 
Inherent in this statement is that due process requires only general notice of the 
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factual allegations and legal theories underlying the formal discipline, and not every 
detail and aspect of the facts and law. General notice of the facts and resulting 
violations is sufficient to allow a "meaningful" evaluation by the employee as to 
whether to appeal. 
Respondent Vernal City, in its Notice of Disciplinary Action, notified 
Petitioner of several violations of City policy (specifically citing to lettered 
subsections within section 12.05.030 of the Vernal City Personnel Manual, entitled 
"Causes for Disciplinary Action") which formed the basis of the City Manager's 
decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The violations are summarized as 
follows: 
1. On January 21, 2016, failing to satisfactorily perform duties when 
Petitioner decided to ignore his assigned task and instead go to another location to 
take photos of another employee, in violation of subsection (D) (inefficiency or 
inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties). 
2. On January 21, 2016, using the City's bucket truck for a purpose unrelated 
to his job duties, in violation of subsection (M) (misusing any City property). 
3. On January 21, 2016, taking another employee away from that employee's 
assigned duties, in violation of subsection (N) ( deliberately restricting employee 
output). 
4. On January 25, 2016, dishonesty in Petitioner telling his supervisor that he 
could not remember the events of January 21, 2016, when in fact he could remember, 
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in violation of subsection (W) (an act of dishonesty related to job performance). 
5. On January 25, 2016, displaying insubordinate behavior in leaving a 
meeting between Petitioner and his supervisor after being told to stay, and after 
being informed that leaving would constitute insubordination and grounds for 
discipline, in violation of subsection (AA) ( displaying insubordinate behavior). 
6. On January 25, 2016, Petitioner not having his cell phone available as 
required by agreement with the City, and choosing not to answer the supervisor's 
phone calls, in violation of subsection (A) (a violation of any of the City Personnel 
Policies). 
7. On January 25, 2016, Petitioner's dishonesty in stating multiple times that 
he did not have his cell phone on him and that the cell phone had been turned off, 
in violation of subsection (W) (an act of dishonesty related to job performance). 
The allegations contained in the Notice of Disciplinary Action gave Petitioner 
general notice of the facts at issue, as well as the alleged violations of policy. 
Petitioner has not argued that there was inadequate notice of the foregoing 
allegations. 
The Appeals Board specifically found in support of each of the foregoing 
allegations. In addition to discussing each allegation specifically, the Appeals Board 
declared that the evidence presented at the hearing supported the allegations as 
"outlined in the notices and in the notice of termination." R.379. The Appeals Board 
did not base its decision on any matters that were not presented through evidence 
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at the hearing. And as discussed below, the Appeals Board did not base its 
affirmation of the termination on any policies or bases not covered by the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action. 
C. All Evidence Heard by the Appeals Board, and Subsequently 
Discussed in the Decision by the Appeals Board, Was Sufficiently 
Related to the Bases for Termination Listed in the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) allows an appeal board to hear evidence 
"which relates to the cause for the discharge." This "imposes a requirement that the 
Appeal Board consider just those instances of misconduct that the [employer] 
identified as the grounds for terminating [the employee] and of which [the 
employee] had been given prior notice." Fierro, 2012 UT App 304 at1 22. Any 
deviation from these standards in the Appeal Board decision should be considered 
a reversible abuse of discretion only if it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Gallegos, 2016 UT App 122, 17, 377 P .3d 185, 
citing Rosen v. Saratoga Springs City, 2012 UT App 291, ,r 8,288 P.3d 606. 
Petitioner has alleged that the Appeals Board considered evidence unrelated 
to the bases for termination listed in the Notice of Disciplinary Action. However, as 
discussed above, Petitioner has failed to cite to any specific examples. Respondents 
herein are confident that the Appeals Board's consideration of the evidence and 
findings in support of upholding termination were based solely on facts sufficiently 
related to the specific bases for termination listed in the Notice of Disciplinary 
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Action. 
For example, the Notice of Disciplinary Action lists three bases for termination 
which were associated with the January 25 meeting between Petitioner and his 
supervisor, including dishonesty regarding Petitioner's memory of what had earlier 
transpired, dishonesty regarding Petitioner's use of his cell phone, and the specific 
insubordinate act of walking out of the meeting and snidely remarking, "Good luck 
with that," when threatened with discipline. Those several bases for termination 
were laced throughout the January 25 meeting. Therefore, the Appeals Board heard 
and considered evidence of recordings from and testimony about the entirety of the 
January 25 meeting, including the final act of walking out. In its findings and 
decision to uphold termination, the Appeals Board discussed the insubordinate acts 
of Petitioner during that meeting. R.380. After declaring that Petitioner had been 
insubordinate during the meeting, the Appeals Board explained that leaving the 
meeting in such a manner was merely the "capstone" of Petitioner's insubordinate 
behavior. Id. The Appeals Board then goes on to find that Petitioner "repeatedly 
refused to answer questions, was evasive, omitted facts, was dishonest about facts 
and circumstances, demonstrated a defiant and hostile attitude toward his 
supervisor, refused to provide the video when requested to do so after finally 
acknowledging its existence, and constantly and loudly tapped his pen on the desk 
during the conversation." Id. While some of these details were not specifically 
discussed in the Notice of Disciplinary Action, Respondents herein are confident that 
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they are sufficiently related to the matters within the Notice of Disciplinary Action 
that the Appeals Board committed no violation in considering them. Furthermore, 
the Appeals Board's decision to consider these facts does not exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. 
D. Even If a Portion of the Bases for Termination Is Considered to Be 
Outside the Scope of Appropriate Consideration by the Appeals 
Board, this Is Harmless Error as the Appeals Board Found a Broad 
Range of Reasons to Terminate Petitioner. 
This Court has previously stated that in the case of error by an appeal board, 
"We will set aside the [appeal board's] decision only if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Gallegos, 2016 
UT App 122 at,t16, citing Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 
755 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). In determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that any error would affect the outcome of the proceedings, this Court must 
determine whether substantial evidence exists in support of the elected discipline at 
issue, independent of any error. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. "Substantial evidence 
is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The Appeals Board made the following specific finding: 
The Board makes the determination and finding that in light of the 
particularly serious violations of dishonesty and insubordination 
combined with the other violations including inefficiency, misusing city 
property, deliberately restricting output, violation of the cell phone 
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policy that the sanction of termination is not an abuse of discretion." 
There is no indication, nor does Petitioner argue, that the Appeals Board 
might have reached a different conclusion if the Appeals Board had not considered 
facts which were related to but not specifically discussed in the Notice of Disciplinary 
Action. For example, the Appeals Board found specifically that Petitioner's exit from 
the January 25 meeting was independently an act of insubordination, as discussed 
in the Notice of Disciplinary Action. It cannot be argued that the Appeals Board 
would have characterized that act differently if it had not considered the 
insubordinate acts during the January 25 meeting which occurred prior to 
Petitioner's exit from that meeting. 
Furthermore, after an opportunity to observe Petitioner during the review 
hearing, the Appeals Board made specific findings of dishonesty and insubordination 
even during the review hearing itself: 
The Board is overwhelmingly convinced based upon its observations of 
Mr. Augustus during the hearing, his testimony at the hearing, and his 
attitude and statements during his meeting with his supervisor and his 
inconsistent statements arising from the pre-disciplinary hearing that 
he lacks credibility, that he is dishonest, and that he was and remains 
insubordinate. In general Mr. Augustus was the most compelling 
witness against himself. 
R.378. These continued violations, even in the presence of the Appeals Board, 
cannot allow any argument that the Appeals Board would have reached a different 
conclusion if the Appeals Board is found to have ventured outside the content of the 
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Notice of Disciplinary Action. 
Moreover, Petitioner has not contested the Appeals Board's findings of 
dishonesty, which the Appeals Board described as a "particularly serious violation". 
R.378. In fact, most of the bases given for the termination are not contested in the 
brief and should therefore be considered admitted. Even if the acts of 
insubordination are removed from the picture, it cannot be argued that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the proceedings would be different because 
the dishonesty remains, together with the other less serious violations, and 
termination remains the discipline that is "(1) appropriate to the offense and (2) 
consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department." See Harmon v. 
Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2007 UT App 336, 11 8, 171 P.3d 474 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of the Appeals Board is still 
supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has not effectively argued otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
· In sum, Petitioner's termination should be upheld because the Appeals Board 
did not abuse its discretion in upholding the City Manager's decision to terminate 
Petitioner. Petitioner's arguments that Petitioner's supervisor violated the law do 
not have any basis in law or fact. Petitioner's argument that the decision of the 
Appeals Board should be reversed because the Appeals Board allegedly considered 
facts outside the scope of the Notice of Disciplinary Action should also fail because 
the argument is inadequately briefed, the Board considered only matters sufficiently 
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related to the bases for termination described in the Notice of Disciplinary Action, 
and/ or any error on the part of the Appeals Board was harmless error. 
_,)j_,uffi_j/c • 715-
Michael D. Harrington P 
Attorney for Respondent Vernal City 
Dated: _)_p_r ·._l _l_lf_,,,. _2_0_f -_ 
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ADDENDUM A 
@ 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Russell Augustus 
FROM: Ken Bassett, City Mansgc1· 
DATF.: Marcb 21, 2016 
RE: Notice of Disciplinary Action 
Dear Mr. Augustus, 
On Friday, March 4, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. a pre-disciplinary hearing was held at the Vernal City 
office at 374 East Main regarding alleged violations of the Vernal City policies.and procedures 
manual. This pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled 10 allow you the opportunity to respond to 
allegations that you violated provisions of this manual, specifically: 
l . l 2.05.030 (D) Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perfoon assigned duties; (M) 
Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of any employee; and 
(N) Deliberately restricting output; 
2. \ 2.05.030 CW) Act of Dishonesty related lo job performance. 
3. 12.05.030 (AA) Displaying insubordinate behavior; . 
4. 12.05.030 (A) A violation of any of the City Personnel Policies or Procedures or any other 
administrative policies as adopted by resolution of the Vernal City Council (not having 
your cell phone available as required by the cell phone use agreement dated April 22, 2013 
and cell phone policy of the City, and 12.05.030 (W) Act of dishonesty related to job 
perfonnance. 
Notice of Decision: 
Incident #1 / Violation #1. January 21, 2016: In the pre-disciplinary hearing notice, it was 
alleged that on the afternoon of January 21, 2016 both you (driving) and Michael Leigh, 
(passenger), were observed traveling on 1500 East adjacent to the City yard (Sumpsions) in the 
City bucket truck. At this particular time, however, you had been given previous direction that 
your task to be performed was located on the west end of the City on Highway 40 associated with 
the banners. Also, at this time as you were on 1500 East adjacent to the City yard it was obser:ved 
that you were either taking photographs or video of an employee who was al that time located in 
that yard, specifically BJ Partridge. There had been no direction given to you be in that area of 
the City while, in fact, you should have been working on your job duties assigned with the banners 
on west Highway 40. 
Mr. Augustus, based on the information from the pre-disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the 
interview which you had with Mr. Allred on January 25lh, your work time sheets specifically for 
January 24th and your job description for the position of Street Equipment Operator II, I have 
detenni.ned that the allegations so stated in incident # I and Violation # l are substantiated. 
Your work assignment, working with Mr. Michael Leigh on January 21 si, was that of putting up 
banners on Main Street and Highway 40 working with Jeff Gardner, who was supervising that 
project. You had been working on the west end of Highway 40 that morning. The bucket truck 
which you were using had some operation problems. and you and Mr. Leigh retwned the bucket 
truck to Motor Pool for repairs. Later in the clay after l'wicb, you and Mr. Leigh took the bucket 
truck, after it bad been repaired, fueled it, and immediately proceeded to go to the 1500 East yard, 
(Sumpsions) at which time you stopped and purposely took pictures of BJ Partridge who was 
operating the loader at that sire. 
ln the pre-disciplin~ hearing, it was noted that during the interview which you had with Mr. 
Allred on January 25 , you could not remember whether or-not you had gone to the l 500 East yard 
or whether you had, at that time, taken photogr1hs / video of Mr. Partridge working at that site. 
At the pre-disciplinary hearing held on March 4 , however, you did remember that you did make 
that trip in the bucket truck with Mr. Leigh for the purpose of taking pictures of Mr. Partridge 
working there at the 1500 East yard. It was repre;;ented during the pre-disciplinary hearing on 
March 4th that you were tired, and that you had worked many hours the day before, and that 
possibly was the reason why you could not remember going to 1500 Eac;t. I determined., however, 
that o'n the evening of January 24, 20 I 6 you finished the snow plowing responsibilities that you 
had and left work at approximately 7:30 p.m. after having worked 14 hours snow plowing. I have 
concluded that this was certainly ample time to get the sleep that you needed before you came to 
work the next morning on January 25th• I do 11ot accept your reasoning that you could not 
remember going to the 1500 East yard or remember that you took photographs / video simply 
because you were fatigued because of the hours that you had worked the day before. 
It was further represented du.ring the pre-disciplinary hearing on March 4th that your reasoning for 
going to the 1500 East yard in the afternoon, after lm1ch, in the bucket truck for the purpose of 
obse1ving Mr. Partridge operating the loader was consistent with your job description assignments 
as "a supervisor". The Vernal City job description for a Streets Equipment Operator Il indicates 
"acts as lead worker or supervisor as required during construction and maintenance projects or in 
the absence of the street superintendent". Specifically, regarding you going to the 1500 East yard 
and taking pictures / video, these were not required supervisory activities for that day, the street 
superintendent was not absent that.day, ngr had.-an:Y0µe asb4 :or- requi~·ect you to supervise any 
aspect of your job assignment 1for that" paf:ttcular:-~y~ Yo~ ·~s~p,d -~uties d~g: with the 
banners and•w.o~g witltMr .-Gar_4ftetbacfboen_gi~en:at1he"·beg~\ottl1e wot]t dayfhowever, 
it~':Y()ut:-tn ip ·s~to· the rsuo.~t-1.•cl:s.lmpty:'.~:~!i~-~f.);fr.,PWdge-·ope~ng 
thtf't~~: . -~-.j~~o,'.ypu took Mr. ~_gh,.,,way.~nr~·l!S$\~~~, as weltQ:opetdng a 
p{e¢tofVd}~-~equipment (the bueket-truck)for a pttrpose1hat-Was not l)art·of your work 
duties·that'particular day. 
Mr, Augustus, I therefore find that you were not satisfactorily perforn1ing your assigned job duties, 
that yo~. were 1ni~µs~g City equip~ent (the buok~t tTI3Qk}f9r. a.purpose that was not part of yQur 
aSsjgtj&i'duties, attifithaf you were also'.tesl'ticting the output ofa: fe1low employee, Michael Leigh, 
by notperihtming your assigned duties. 
Incident:#2 / Violation #2. On Monday, .lan.uary25'1' at approximatelj) 3: 15 pm you were :askttd 
to be in fl meeting with your supervisor Glade Allred. You pttended that meeti7!g at which time 
Mr. Al!red proceeded to ask you several q~e~(i(!n.s regqrqipg p~"Yf~us inclile~ wh'tch had 
oc.~e'd as part of your per/or!'Jance. one .iJf'wbldli- in~ulleii;yoti· ikivinJ ·11i .-the· liucket truck on 
'fl1Ui's.ila,. January 1181 w.tth Mtvhda1 btigh dh· tnlf venitlb wiih')JOU. During-the"'1rie'e'Jing Mr. 
Allredmkedyou-sp~cificallyify®had, ,infact drlven1he bucket truckto·tMJSO()East lot.Jn the 
aftm2oon. 'You lrµllcated io 'him tiiat yoii could not remembe1~ when -i11fe.e1, wiJne.ss statements 
fr;,m• two indi.yiduals indicated that you · had indeed driven alnng JSO(J- · East by the City yard 
(Surttpions) laking pictures or videos. 
I :wilLstate as I stated above, in Incident #lt Violation #1: 
· ln the ·pre;-disciplbl~ hearing" h was lfGted: tl,utt &µing 'the interview which you had with Mr. 
Allted;'on-January~2St ·yo~--~~ld;tot'~i~r~ethe{9tl.1otyoµ had gone to thc-J~00:1-t.yard 
or w:l\~ttier yo~ -~ad,.lJithattim~ taken·'p'llo~bfl:vid~ o,·Mt.:i~dge wt?rkiDg~a,Hhat ~ite. 
At the pi'e-4i~Qgjliriafy:heanng1ndld 6ti.~n .4t1i~lioWev~~ yoti ~'-tiillmlberthatyott Jtiacm that 
trip in the'0bucke't1tnck witl1-Mr.Leiglfforthe:pm)'Ostroftalci"ngJji~of'Mr. Partridge working 
there at the 1500 East yard. It was. repres¢nted:d~~g,the ~e-di$Qjplliwy b~ng tbat .you were 
tired and that you had worlrett.,fho~-the day ~fore:1ma,~tp~lyw~ t\ie'-~Ql') that you 
could not remember going:to 1500~. l~etetmlne<f-tliat{'~tfthe,everiittg-:of Jan~:24, 2016 you 
finished the snow plowing respoi:JsmWW tnafji6utiaihiiidleft'w• at·ap_p~~ly'7:00 pm -
7=30 pm-after-hav:ing worked 14ho»rs·sriowptowmg. tHavcf®tlciudett:imf1his was~tun· i<ftime 
to get the $leep'tljat}'9M~e$1l1!$te,~ am\!! w'~iki!\e~j,U~;l)nJ~ lSK ldo 
~oi·:~_f<>l.lt~;tJiatyou coµl411ot-remeD;iber·gojn~1lie 1,no~yard;-ot remember 
tlmt-you took pK616gmplis l video sitnpty·because y-ou were fatigued· because of the hours that you 
had worked the day before. 
Mr. Augustust based on the informatio.n from the pre-disciplinary-hearing, the transcriptiQn of the 
interview which you had. with Mr. Allred on January 2511', your work time sheets.specifically for 
January 25th, I have dete1mined that the. allegations so stated in Incident #2 / Violation #2 are 
substantiated. 
~. 
. ) ) 
Incident #3 / Violation #3. On January 25, 2016 you were asked to attend a meeting in Glade 
Al/red's office, your supervisor. You anended that meeting, howevet, during the course of thar 
meeting you indicated that you were going to leave. Mr. Allred asked you to stay because the 
meeling was nbt yet completed, but you left anyway. Mr. Allred indicated to you that leaving the 
meeting could constitule cause for disciplinary action up to and including termination of your 
employment. 
After reviewing both the infonnation from the pre-disciplinary hearing as well as the transcription 
of the.interview which you.had with Mr. Allred on January 25th, I have deterrnin~d the allegations 
in Incident #3 and Violation #3 are substa.ntiated. 
Mr. Allred had indicated to you during the interview that although you communicated your intent 
to leave prior to the interview being completed, he said you should not leave1.mtil he said that you 
were allowed to leave. Further, the transcription indicates that Mr. Allred indicated that1f you did 
leave, your action ofleaving without-being invited to leave would be an act of insubordination that 
would be followed up with disciplinary action up to and including termination of your 
employment. Although the transcription of the tape shows that you and Mr. Allred were talking 
over each other during th.is part of the discussion, the tape does indicate Mr. Allred's comment "up 
to and including-tennination". You indicated dwi ng the pre-disciplinary hearirig that you did not 
hear that, although in the trans~ription ofthe tape, you responded to Mr. Allred after he had asked 
you to stay with the statement "have fun with that". I conclude that you did receive warning from 
Mr. Allred that disciplinary action would be taken up to and iocludll}g tennination of your 
employment. I find that your statement that you were not aware of Mr. Allred's directive not to 
leave his office is directly contrary to your following statement "have fun with that", indicating to 
me that you were not being honest in your answers given in the pre-disciplinary hearing. 
Incident #4 / Violation ff4. On January. 25, 2016 Mr. Glade Allred attempted to call you on 
your cell phone. Later in the morning you appeared in Mr. Allred 's office who indicated to you 
that he had been trying to get a hold of you on your cell phone. You indicated to him that "I 
haven ;t had "IY cell phone ". However, it has been documented that you texted Sherri 
Montgomery that same morning al 9:2.6 am, and several texts through 10:01 am on that very 
morning on your cell phone showing that you did, in fact, have your cell phone with you. 
The personnel manual of the City regarding the cell phone policy is as follows: 
9.05.040-Employee responsibilities. Any employee of the City receiving either a cell phone 
allowanc.e or a City issued cell phone will sign the City cell phone.use / and or allowance request 
form thereQy certifying tha~ he or she will provide their phone number witrun five days of 
activation and will be available for caHs,(in possession of.the phone·an'd have it turned on) when it 
may be required to be avrulable for City business. If not availabie to reeei:ve calls or transmit 
calls, the employee shall so notify his depnrtment head. 
The V emal City cell phone allowaney ~1d use agreement which you signed on April 22, 2013 
indicates that you agreed to abide by all regulations in the Vernal City personnel policies and 
procedures manual pertaining to the use of the cell phone. 
I ' I ) 
Specifically,-regarding incident#4 on January 25th, you indicated to Mr. Allred in the meeting with 
him that "I hayen't-h&d my cell phone." Furth-er, -during the interview with Mr. Allred, you 
indicated "my-phone has been off all day." 
During tlie pre-=<fiscipl:inary hearing, you ·did acknotledge-that you had texted Sherri Montgome1y 
and she had text~d.you tht:: mormng :of January 25-'. IA fact, Ms. Montgomery indicated during 
the. pre-discipli!lai"y hearing that that had.occurred between 9:26 am and 10:0 I am. 
Duriri~:~e pre-discipti.nary' hearing, you bad sub~itted a phone fog fr0f!1 Jan.~ary-25th produced by 
Straut:Networks'showihg that-you had not'received::a phone call from Mr. Allied or any texts from 
M~. N-1.oq'tgo~ecy. Duril}g .the prtX!isci~linary·h<?aring thy record shows that you were asked to 
pr6_ducpe,f mor~'cpmplete·phone Iag.from,Strata:Networks,, Th~.Citydid l'CcCCive an e-mail from 
Mt. K'.;6sselrin8, yo'ur,attomey; "indicat.mtthatlyou.weri,hav.ing,dif.ficul.ty getting tha:t reeord from· 
Strata. Mr. 'Harr.ington responded to Mt. Kesselring indicating to 1nm spe-cifi'c dl.rections ns to 
how yo'lnnight obtain that record and.if you C'ouldhlt tofu1ther:give M.r. -Harrington,a -c~ll•ana 1te 
would see i'the rcould foliow through with tl\.e request. Mr: .Kesselring diMespond indicating that 
no furthe,r-de(ail .of ypur pbone log coulg. be obtnined without'-pr.oviding a subpoena. I do have 
evidence,-however, showing that Mr. A'l!red did try to '.get' a hold of-you the morning of January 
2:51", and also faat Ms. Montgomery. did. text ·you ·and you ·texted her back '•n January 25th• l 
conci~de, therefore, that yot1 drd'have yow- P,hone during the morning of January 25 th and that you 
naa be~ using j.our' pho.ne during the morning of January'2.51h. However, it was your choice not 
to answer the phbne call from- Mi-. Allred, dwfo'g the mQi"riing of ranuary 25th• 
A!fter reviewing the infonnatfon from the pre-disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the 
interview wnicli·you had with.Mr: Allred·on January 251h, the phone records of Mr. Allred and Ms. 
Mon~goroer-y, 9:9-d your own phone logs submitt~ at the hearing, I have determined that the 
allegations i11;.Incidertt #4 and Violatfon #4 are substantiated. 
Decision for Disciplinary Actio;n: Based on the:substantiation of the violations of Vernal City 
personnel policies and procedures·manual as noted.above and after considering.your responses to 
the above nllegationS'dunngihe pre-discipLiflacy hearing, {nave detennined-that'the allegations as 
listed above are, in fact, substantiated and as a result of.this ~15stantiation of these vfolations it is 
my decision to terminate your employmeut with Vernal City effective immediately. 
Tn accordance with Utah State law and Vernal City polic'}',, you ·hav.e the right to file a formal 
appeal of your tennination of employment to"the Vernal ·City 0ouncil who serves as the Appeals 
Board of the Cify following the exhaustion 9f-the grievance procedures as established by Vernal 
City personnel· policies Chapter 16. Suoh appe;,.1s shall ~filed witMhe City Recorder within ten 
( I 0) days after completing the grievance procedure. Please contac.tme or Roxanne Behunin if 
there are any questions regarding the process to file an appeal of this. decision. Enclosed fur your 
reference is a copy of the Utah1State 9ode 10~3-1106 and Vernal City Code 2.80 .. 020 - 2.80.025 
which more. specifically outlines the appeals process. 
ln processing your termination of employment, several documents will need to be provided. We 
will make these available to you. The prompt execution of these documents would he 
appreciated. Please note that health and dental benefits will continue through March 31, 20 16. 
Your final paycheck will be issued within 72 hours of you submitting a final time sheet. 
4.x-6.d<>J&f 
Ke~sett, City Manager 
Signature of Russell Augustus 
Receipt of Disciplinary Notice 
cc: personnel file 
Date 
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MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540 
ALLRED, BROT HERSON & HARRINGTON, P .C. 
Attorneys for Vernal City 
148 South Vernal Ave. Suite 101 
Vernal, Ut ah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-7800 
harrington@abhlawfirm.com 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD 
VERNAL CITY COUNCIL, VERNAL CITY 
UINTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE APPEAL OF 
RUSSEL AUGUSTUS 
Background : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: 
TERMINATION APPEAL 
Russell Augustus , the Appellant, appealed the decision o f 
the City Manager , which was issued following a pre- disciplinary 
hearing held March 4 , 2016 in the Vernal City administrative 
conference room. 
The Appellant was given notice of the pre-disciplinary 
hearing on January 29, 2016. 
The Appellant was present a t t he pre-disciplinary hearing 
along with h i s attorney, Christian Kesselring . The City was 
represented by Mike Harrington. 
Witnesses were called and testified at that pre-disciplinary 
hearing and the Appellant had an opportunity to present his 
response to the issues raised by the pre-disciplinary hearing 
notice . 
The reasons for potential disciplinary action we r e outlined 
in the notice of the hearing and were reviewed again at the 
beginning of the pre-disciplinary hearing by the hearing officer 
Kenneth Bassett. 
A written decision and notice of disciplinary action was 
issued by Ken Bassett fol l owing the hearing , in which he reviewed 
each of the charges , and outlined briefly the findings, and found 
that each of the allegations were substantiated. 
The employee/Appellant, was advised by a written Notice of 
Disciplinary Action dated March 21, 2016 that based upon the 
substantiated violations , his employment with Vernal City 
was t erminated effective immediately. 
Mr. Augustus, the Appellant, through his attorney, filed a 
Notice of Appeal dated March 30, 2016. 
By stipulation the parties agreed that the hearing before 
the Appeal Board would be held beginning at 4:30 PM on May 3, 
2016 in the Vernal City Council Chambers. 
The Appellant was present, represented by his attorney 
Christian Kesselring, the City was represented by Michael 
Harrington. The Board was assisted by its legal advisor Dennis L. 
Judd. 
Each of the parties identified the witnesses they intended 
to call and those witnesses were sworn and the Hearing Board 
invoked the exclusionary rule. 
The following witnesses were called and examined: 
Called by the City: 
Glade Allred 
Ken Bassett 
BJ Partridge 
Leon Morris 
Rick Green 
Sherri Montgomery 
Russell Augustus 
Called by Appellant: 
Michael Leigh 
Russell Augustus 
Clay Simmons 
Rick Green ~ 
ayaA &aiae~t1oa:c II I .. 
-.1'.eseph Nan·hon 
Ken Bassett 
Glade Allred 
The parties stipulated to the admission of a packet of 
exhibits from each party. 
Near the end of the hearing counsel for the parties 
requested an opportunity to submit a brief on several legal 
issues which the Hearing Board agreed to allow with the briefs to 
be submitted by May 10, 2016. Those briefs were submitted and 
were considered by the Board prior to voting and making its 
decision. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the Board met briefly to 
deliberate but, due to the lateness of the hour, adjourned the 
meeting and deliberations and agreed to resume deliberations on 
May 9th, 2016 at 8:00 PM to allow the Board an opportunity to 
review all of the exhibits and carefully consider the testimony 
and evidence presented. 
) 
The Board met on May 9 , 2016 but had not yet received the 
briefs from the parties and after deliberating and discussing the 
evidence further, adjourned the meeting until May 16 , 2016, at 
6:00 eM to allow opportunity to consider the briefs before making 
a final decision. 
Each of the Board members has carefully considered the 
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the 
exhibits submitted by the parties by stipulation, and has 
listened to the recording of the meeting between t he Appellant 
and his department head Glade Allred on January 25, 2016 , the 
pre-disciplinary hearing transcript, and has considered not only 
the words spoken but the demeanor and tone of voice of the 
Appellant and other witnesses from the hearing before the Board 
and the meeting on January 25, 2016 . 
The Board has considered the briefs submitted by each of the 
parties. 
The Board considered the proposed ballot and the comments 
made by counsel for each party regarding the ballot and adopted 
the ballot prepared by the legal counsel for the Board, a copy of 
which is attached. 
The standard of review used by the Board in considering the 
actions and decision of the City Manager to terminate the 
Appe l lant is abuse of discretion wi th the evidentiary standard of 
substantial evidence being required to support the basis of the 
decision. 
Four (4) reasons or policy violations were noted in the 
Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing and in the Notice of 
Discipl inary Action . They were : 
1 . Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform 
assigned duties; misusing , destroying, or damaging any city 
property, or the property of any employee; deliberately 
restricting output; 
2 . Dishonesty related to job performance; 
3 . Insupordination; and 
4 . Violation of city personnel policies or procedures, 
including the cell phone policy. 
Having considered the documents filed with the Board, the 
evidence and the arguments, and now being fuly informed, 
The Board Finds That : 
A. Regarding the charge of "inefficiency or inability to 
satisfactorily perform assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or 
damaging any city property , or the property of an y employee; 
deliberately restricting outputu: 
1. On January 21 , 2016 the Appellant was assigned to place 
banners on poles on the west side of the city under the direction 
of Jeff Gardner, who was the designated supervisor of that 
project. Mr. Augustus was operating a bucket truck owned by the 
city. 
2. Later in the morning, the bucket truck experienced 
mechanical problems and was returned to motor pool for repairs. 
While the bucket truck was being repaired, the Appellant drove a 
city pickup truck to the 1500 East Yard, reportedly to check on 
the repair of a water line leak, and, as he was driving away from 
that location with Mr. Leigh as a passenger, had a conversation 
with his supervisor Mr. Allred. 
3. After lunch the Appellant took the bucket truck with Mr. 
Michael Leigh, another city equipment operator, as a passenger, 
fueled the truck, and then proceeded down 500 North, turning 
South on 1500 East to pass by the 1500 East Yard. The Appellant 
claims that his purpose in taking that route was to fix banners 
on the east side of town that Mr. Leigh had earlier installed 
incorrectly. There is no evidence that Mr. Gardner or Mr. Allred 
approved diverting equipment and personnel from the west side of 
town to the east side of town. 
4. The Board finds that the real reason for the diversion 
was that the Appellant desired to drive by the 1500 East Yard to 
video another city employee, BJ Partridge, who was testing a 
piece of city equipment at that yard, as assigned by Mr. Allred. 
5. The video was taken using the Appellant's cell phone, 
which is a city subsidized cell phone, and as such is subject to 
city cell phone policy. 
6. It appears from the video that the Appellant introduced 
at the hearing, that the Appellant was driving the city bucket 
truck while videoing with his cell phone, which is an unsafe and 
illegal practice. During the meeting between Mr. Augustus and Mr. 
Allred on January 25, Mr. Augustus refused to answer questions 
about where he took the bucket truck after lunch and claimed 
several times that he returned to the west side of the city to 
work on banners as he had been assigned. In subsequent 
proceedings, the Appellant admitted that that was not true. 
7. The Appellant later claimed that the purpose of the video 
was safety concerns, however the Board finds that the video was 
never provided to his department head in spite of a request that 
he do so, nor was it provided to anyone else in the city 
administration until the hearing before the Appeals Board. The 
Board finds that the Appellants statements regarding the video 
are false. 
8. The Board notes that when questioned by his supervisor, 
Glade Allred, several days after the incident the Appellant was 
very evasive and was not truthful about the purpose of his going 
by the 1500 East Yard. 
9. Mr. Augustus's claims about the reason for his taking the 
video lack credibility for at least the following reasons: 
a. If he was concerned about safety of persons or 
equipment he should have immediately provided the video to Mr. 
Allred or to Allen Parker or Ken Bassett, which he did not do and 
in fact refused to provide the video; 
b. He was evasive and untruthful about having taken the 
video, and the purposes of the video; it appea r s from the video 
that was provided that he was driving by the yard while taking 
the video rather than stopping in a safe manner to take the video 
and reporting his concerns immediately to appropriate city 
officials ; 
c . He f ailed and refused to provide the video to his 
supervisor when d irectly requested to do so, and c laimed during 
the meeting that he did not have his cell phone and did not know 
where it was , which is a violation of city policy. 
10 . The charges in Count one are established by substantial 
evidence. 
11 . The Appellant was operating a large piece of city 
equipment in an area where he should not have been, occupying the 
time of that equipment and the time of himself and another city 
empl oyee, engaging in activity which he apparently felt 
uncomfortable in reporting or admitting to his supervisor when 
questioned , at a time when he had been assigned to work at the 
opposite end of the city. 
12 . The Appellant's conduct wasted city resources and placed 
the city at risk and was contrary to his assigned work area. 
13. Mr. Augustus's statements regarding the incident lack 
any credibility. 
B. Regarding the charge of "dishonesty related to job 
performance": 
1 . The Board, having reviewed the transcript of t he meeting 
between Mr. Augustus and his department head Mr . Allred, and 
having heard the tone of voice and the evasiveness evidenced in 
that interview, and based upon the hearing testimony and 
exhi bits, finds that the Appellant was dishonest in his 
statements and explanations concerning his activities on January 
21 , 2015 , inc luding the r eason for taking the city bucket truck 
and another city employee to 1500 East and in his stated reasons 
for videoing Mr. Partridge. 
2 . The Appellan t refused to acknowledge videoing a fellow 
city employee operating a piece of city equipment , was evasive, 
and avoided or refused to answer direct questions concerning the 
incident. 
3. The Appellant stated that he would provide a copy of the 
video when he finally acknowledged that he had it, which he 
failed to do. 
4. The Appellant falsely stated that his concern was the 
safety of an employee or equipment which, as outlined above, 
lacks any credibility. 
5. At the hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board 
observed Mr. Augustus, both while he was testifying and when he 
was not testifying, and finds that his answers to questions 
propounded by the attorney for the city were evasive, that his 
demeanor evidenced lack of truthfulness, and that based upon his 
actions and statements in the recorded conversation with his 
supervisor and his testimony at the hearing it is difficult to 
afford any degree of credibility to the statements made by the 
Appellant . 
6 . The Board finds that there is substantial evidence to 
support the finding that the Appellant was dishonest: 
a. He stat ed that he could not remember or had not gone 
by the 1500 Eas t Yard; 
b . He claimed that he had returned to work putting up 
banners on the west side of the city, traveling along 100 North; 
c. He claimed that he did not have his telephone when 
Mr. Allred attempted to contact him on January 25 ; 
d . He stated that his purpose in going by the 1500 East 
yard was solely to fix banners on the East side of the city. 
e. When questioned during his meeting with his 
supervisor and at the hearing about matters that he did not want 
to admit to or discuss, Mr. Augustus was deceptive and claimed he 
couldn ' t remember , yet on the same dates he appeared to have a 
very vivid recollection when it served his interests; 
f . The Board finds the testimony of Ricky Green, who 
reported Mr. Augustus to be dishonest to be credible; and 
g. Mr. Augustus changed his story repeatedly, and 
omitted facts and feigned lack of memory. Mr . Augustus also made 
misleading statements about his use of city equipment and about 
the video, and made dishonest statements about taking the video 
and about the purpose of the video. 
C. Regarding the charge of " insubordination": 
1. The Board has reviewed the transcript and listened to the 
recording of the meeting between the Appellant and his department 
head Mr. Allred on January 25, 2016, and finds that there is more 
than substantial evidence to show that the Appe l lant was 
• 
.. 
j 
insubordinate throughout the meeting with his supervisor. 
2 . The Appellant ' s general tone of voice , attitude , tapping 
o f a marker on the table, and refusal and failure to answer 
questions honestly and directly demonstrated a l ack of respect 
for his supervisor. 
3. The Appellant was evasive, refused to ans wer questions, 
was disrespectful, ordered the supervisor to "move on'' after 
evading quest i ons, cursed, and ultimatel y walked out of the 
meeting after being specifically and clearly d irected by his 
super visor to remain in the meeting. Moreover , he did walk out 
after being advised that refusal to remain in the meeting would 
be considered insubordination and may result in his termination. 
4 . The Appellant's disrespectful retort as he left the 
meeting "good luck with that" further i llustrates a series of 
disrespectful and insubordinate statements and conduct by the 
Appellant during that meeting toward his supervisor, which is 
illustrated to some degree by the transcript but more forcefully 
by the audio recording of the meeting. 
5 . The Board is convinced that the purpose of the 
Appellant ' s video on the east side of the city on January 21, 
when he was assigned to work on the west side of the city, was 
not motivated by a safety concern but rather was an effort to 
undermine and get information to damage his department head . 
6. The Appellant's attitude during the meeting with Mr. 
Allred was insubordinate, confrontationa l , dishonest , and 
disrespectful. 
7. At no time following that meeting did the Appellant make 
any effort to apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any 
wil lingness or desire to work cooperatively with his supervisor 
or make any effort to resolve any concerns or differences. 
8. Had the Appellant's attitude following that meeting up to 
and through the hearing before the Board been different or mo r e 
cooperative or upfront and honest t he result might well have been 
different. Instead the Appellant has remained defiant, aggressive 
and dishonest. 
9 . In the meeting with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was 
requested at least twice to provide a copy of the video that he 
took while driving the city truck , yet he did not provide that 
until played for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals 
Board . During his testimony before the Appeals Board he claimed 
no one asked for the video which is a clear act of dishonesty and 
false statement under oath before the Appeals Board, as shown by 
the audio recording and transcription of that meeting . 
10. From all of the evidence, including the transcripts and 
recording of the interview with his supervisor through the 
hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board finds that Mr. 
Augustus's actions have been targeted towards undermining his 
supervisor so that he could take over the Department. 
11. Mr. Augustus's statements about his not having his phone 
available when his supervisor was attempting to contact him are 
untruthful and also insubordinate. It is clear that he had his 
telephone available since he made use of it, yet he failed to 
answer calls from his supervisor or to return calls that had been 
made to him. 
12. The Appellant was untruthful in claiming that his texts 
with Sherri Montgomery were during his break since the time line 
of those texts demonstrates a period in excess of a normal break. 
13. The Appellant is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing 
to admit his activities, lying about his activities, and failing 
to acknowledge his fault and misconduct when he made a mistake. 
His attitude throughout has been to cast blame on others but not 
to take any responsibility himself. 
14. The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only 
demonstrated by the transcripts and recordings prior to the 
hearing, but the Board notes, his facial expressions, demeanor 
and behavior at the hearing when answering questions regarding 
the events and during the testimony of Mr. Allred including 
smirking, rolling his eyes and other conduct and expressions 
further confirms a lack of respect and an insubordinate attitude. 
15. A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect 
was also demonstrated and observed by the Board during the 
hearing. During the testimony of Mr. Bassett, Mr. Augustus was 
observed to glare at the witness and rolled his eyes, and acted 
in a hostile and disrespectful manner. 
16. The Vernal City Road Department is a fairly small 
department with a limited number of employees. The actions of Mr. 
Augustus show that he is not amenable to supervision and cannot 
work there under the direction of the department head, Mr. 
Allred. This results in part from his insubordination and his 
dishonesty in dealing with his department head and with others 
and from the fact that he has not made any effort to resolve the 
issues or acknowledge his misconduct. Even at the hearing it was 
apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful attitude, and 
has no willingness to acknowledge his own errors. Any discipline 
less than termination would not bring about needed change. The 
Appellant's return to the road department would be detrimental to 
the morale, productivity, and operation of the department, and 
would undermine the ability of Mr. Allred to manage the 
employees. 
D. Regarding the charge of "violation of city personnel 
policies or procedures, including the cell phone policy": 
• 
1 . There is substantial evidence that the Appellant violated 
the City's cell phone policies and p rocedures as indicated in the 
Notice of Disciplinary Action and as outlined i n the findings set 
forth above. The City Manager did not abuse his discretion in 
finding violations of t he personnel policies including cell phone 
policy . 
E . Regarding issues raised in briefs: 
1 . A supervisor has t he r ight and the responsibility to look 
into concerns tha t arise about an employee and to investigate. 
Tha t investigation may include inter viewing or questioning the 
employee or other witnesses. Such a meeting is part of the 
supervisory responsibility of the supervisor or department head, 
and is not a pre-disc ipline hearing, even if the supervisor has 
outlined a list of questions or issues of concern prior to the 
meeting. Meeting with the Appellant to give him an opportunity to 
explain what had transpired on January 21 was proper, and t he 
fact that Mr . Allred had outli ned some possible ques t ions as part 
of his fac t -finding pursuit does not undermine his credibility, 
as suggested by the Appellant's brief. 
2 . According to the Appel lant' s brief both Mr . Leigh and Mr. 
Augustus were questioned by their supervisor o n January 25th 
about the same incidents and both were instructed t o take some 
paid vacation time . Apparently Mr. Leigh responded differently to 
the meeting with his supervisor than Mr. Augustus such t hat he 
was not terminated. As out l ined above, Mr. Augus t us' s attitude 
and behavior took him down an entirely different r oad . 
3. Insubordination. 
a. The Board finds that Mr . Augustus behavior, 
statements, and actions demonstrate that when he igno red the 
directions to help f in ish install i ng banners on the wes t side of 
the city and instead drove the city bucket truck and another city 
employee to the east side o f the city and passed the yard while 
taking video wi th his city subsidized phone , his i ntent was to 
unde rmine his department head , Mr. Allred. The video that he took 
of another employee operating the city equipment , which was 
provided for . t he first time at the hearing before the Appeals 
Board demonstrates t ha t he was unsafely operating the city bucket 
truck by videoing while driving, and i t appears that he had 
planned i n advance to take the video and had manipulated his 
phone wh ile driving and prior to reaching the yard . 
b. The claims made by the Appellant that the purpose of 
videoing was to address a safety concern i s entirely contradicted 
by his fa i l ure to provide that video to anyone in t he ci ty or to 
r eport his concerns to his supervisor or other c ity officials. 
c. In fact, Mr. Augustus went out of his way to avoid 
admitting t hat he had t ake n the video during his meeting with h i s 
supervisor and failed and refused in spi te of repeated requests 
to provide the video taken on the city subsidized cell phone. In 
so doing he violated city policy and contradicted any argument 
that he undertook that activity for a legitimate purpose. When 
interviewed several days later about the events on the day that 
Mr. Augustus took the video with his cell phone, he claimed no 
memory of that particular event but had good recall of the other 
events of that same day. If he had a legitimate concern about 
safety issues, it is not credible to believe that he would 
remember other insignificant events of the day but lack recall as 
to that matter. 
d. During the interview with Mr. Allred, the Appellant 
was evasive and defensive and aggressive when questioned on those 
matters. 
e. During his testimony before the hearing Board when 
questioned by opposing counsel about those matters he once again 
reacted in an evasive, confrontational manner. 
f. During questioning by opposing counsel about matters 
discussed during the staff or safety meeting· early in the day the 
Appellant admitted that he missed a portion of the meeting to 
take a personal phone call, yet insisted that he had a better 
knowledge of everything that was discussed during that meeting 
than his supervisor who was present for the entire meeting. 
Moreover, the Appellant became intransigent and his behavior and 
attitude on the stand was consistent with the tone of the 
recording of his interview with Mr. Allred and evidenced lack of 
credibility. 
g. The events from January 21, 2016, and the attitude 
and behavior of the Appellant from that time through the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing demonstrate more interest 
in undermining his supervisor and no evidence whatsoever of any 
effort or desire to work cooperatively within the Department 
structure or chain of command. 
h. The Appellant's attitude, nonverbal displays, and 
facial expressions during the hearing on the stand were 
disturbing and pronounced and reflect an attitude, disrespect, 
and a disregard for truth. 
i. The Appellant's statement as he left the meeting 
with his supervisor in blatant disregard of the instruction that 
he remain at the meeting - the comment "good luck with that" - is 
consistent with the attitude and actions displayed at the 
evidentiary hearing before the Board. The ''good luck with that'' 
attitude which remains unchanged shows that he cannot work 
effectively under the supervision of the road department head, 
and that his continuing presence there and insolent attitude 
would be disruptive to the good order and efficient operation of 
the entire department. 
j. Had the Appellant at any time prior to the 
pre-disciplinary hearing or even during the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrated through his words and demeanor and behavior any 
cha nge of attitude , recognition of his misconduct, any desire to 
mend fences and work cooperatively with his supervisor and within 
the structure of the department as a positive productive employee 
the outcome might well be different. 
4. Authority to Issue Order. 
a. The Appellant has not provided any substantial 
evidence that Mr. Allred did not have proper authority to direct 
him to rema in at t he meeting. It is within the inherent authority 
of a supervisor to inquire into issues of concern relating to an 
employee and to request information from the employee as part of 
that process. The nature of· the work for which the Appellant is 
employed frequent ly requires work beyond a specific quitting 
time. 
b. Even if the Appellant were on an eight (8) hour day 
schedule he had missed several hours that day for personal 
business , and the supervisor could require him to stay. 
c. The Department head did not order Mr. Augustus to 
remain in the meeting for the purpose of providing "a foot 
massage" but rather in an attempt to pierce the intransigent 
refusal of the Appellant to honestly and directly answer 
questions propounded by his supervisor . 
d. The Board believes that is a prope r exercise of 
supervisory responsibility and authority. 
5 . Paid Vacation Time. 
a . Testimony at the hearing shows that the policy and 
long-standing practice at the city has been that department heads 
may, under appropriate circumstances , require an employee to take 
several days of vacation. This may be to allow the employee to 
deal with personal issues, or it may be to allow an employee time 
to cool off or settle down . That i s paid time off . The direction 
to Mr . Augustus to take vacation time was consistent with that 
policy and practice . In light of the behavior and attitude of the 
Appellant, Mr. Augustus, the direction to take some paid vacation 
time off was advisable, and was not an abuse of discretion nor 
did it exceed the authority of the supervisor. 
b. The application and imposition of paid vacation time 
was a llowed pursuant to city policies section 5.01 . 010 and action 
5 .01 . 060, including the provision that "as he deems necessary, a 
department head may require an employee to use any accrued 
vacation leave . " The application and interpretation of that 
policy by the department head and the city manager is consistent 
with long-standing application and interpretation of that policy, 
and the Appellant did not present any substantial evidence to the 
contrary. 
F. Regarding ballot issues: 
1. Pre-Disciplinary Procedures. 
a. Prior to imposing any discipline involving a 
suspension without pay for more than two (2) days, termination, 
transfer to a position of lesser pay for disciplinary reasons 
etc. as defined by state statute, a notice of a pre-disciplinary 
hearing including at least a brief outline of the charges or 
allegations against the employee is required. A sufficient notice 
of pre-disciplinary hearing was provided to the Appellant and he 
was given notice or an outline of the allegations against him and 
ample opportunity to prepare for that hearing. A hearing was 
conducted at which he was represented by counsel and had an 
opportunity to present his response to the allegations as well as 
to question witnesses against him. No discipline which is subject 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1105 and 1106 
was imposed prior to notice and the pre-disciplinary hearing. 
Paid leave or vacation does not require a pre-disciplinary 
hearing. 
b. It is noted that Mr. Augustus repeatedly claimed 
during the hearing that he was a supervisor or second-in-command 
under the Department Head in the road department. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated section 10-3-1105 (2) (c) (vi) and {vii), a 
person in that position, i.e. a deputy head of a municipal 
department or division or a superintendent, may be an at will 
employee not entitled to the procedural protections outlined in 
the statute and the city ordinance. 
2. Disparity of Discipline. 
a. At the evidentiary hearing the defendant asked 
questions about several other non-road department·ernployees whose 
discipline was less than termination. The evidence shows that 
each of those other employees demonstrated an entirely different 
attitude when confronted with their mistakes and were willing to 
acknowledge that they needed to change and committed to improved 
behavior or performance. None of the other situations presented 
demonstrated a continuing defiance and disrespectful attitude and 
for that reason among others none of those cases are comparable 
to the present case of Mr. Augustus. 
b. The Appellant failed to present any substantial 
evidence that he has been treated disparately and he has failed 
to meet his burden in that regard. 
3. Proportionality. 
a. The Appellant has failed to present any evidence 
that his discipline is disproportionate to the violations of 
policy which the Board finds he committed. The Board unanimously 
finds that the City Manager did not abuse his discretion in 
imposing the discipline of termination in light of all of the 
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facts and circumstances. The Board is overwhelmingly convinced 
based upon its observations of Mr. Augustus during the hearing, 
his testimony at the hearing, and his attitude and statements 
during his meeting with his supervisor and his inconsistent 
statements arising from the pre-disciplinary hearing that he 
lacks credibility, that he is dishonest, and that he was and 
remains insubordinate. In general Mr. Augustus was the most 
compelling witness against himself. 
G. The Board unanimously finds that the facts support the 
charges made against the Appellant. 
H. The Board unanimously finds that the charges warrant the 
sanction imposed and that the disciplinary action of termination 
should be sustained and that the City Manager did not abuse his 
discretion in imposing the sanction of termination. In connection 
therewith, the Board has considered as requested by the Appellant 
whether the sanction imposed was proportionate to the offense and 
whether or not the sanction is consistent with sanctions imposed 
against other employees for similar conduct. 
I. The Board makes the determination and finding that in 
light of the particularly serious violations of dishonesty and 
insubordination combined with the other violations including 
inefficiency, misusing city property, deliberately restricting 
output, violation of the cell phone policy that the sanction of 
termination is not an abuse of discretion. 
J. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the sanction of 
termination is inconsistent with sanctions imposed against other 
employees for similar conduct. 
The Board Concludes That: 
A. The claims of the Appellant that he is a supervisor or 
second-in-command in the road Department may render him an at 
will employee pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-31105(2) (vi) 
and (iiv). 
B. Notwithstanding that claim, the Appellant has been 
afforded full due process consistent with the case law of the 
United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of the State 
of Utah and State statute and city ordinance. 
C. The Appellant was given notice of a pre-disciplinary 
hearing which sufficiently outlined the alleged misconduct and 
violations of Vernal City personnel policies and procedures. 
D. The Appellant was given more than a month to prepare for 
the pre-disciplinary hearing, which was held on March 4, 2016. 
E. At that hearing, the Appellant was represented by capable 
counsel, and he had an opportunity to present testimony and 
evidence in response to those allegations and to question 
witnesses against him. 
F. The City Manager conducted the hearing and made his 
determination in light of the facts and information presented and 
the applicable policies and standards of the city. The standard 
of review of that decision is abuse of discretion. 
G. Mr. Augustus timely filed his Notice of Appeal and 
alleged that the City Manager's findings were not supported by 
the evidence and that the decision to impose the penalty of 
termination for the misconduct was arbitrary and capricious and 
denied Mr. Augustus due process rights. 
H. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager 
first to determine if the findings are supported by the evidence. 
The findings are each supported by substantial evidence. 
I. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager 
to determine if there was an abuse of discretion and if the City 
Manager acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, thereby 
denying Mr. Augustus his due process rights. The Board finds that 
the City Manager (1) did not abuse his discretion, (2) did not 
act in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and (3) did not deny 
Mr. Augustus's due process rights under state and federal law. 
J. Both substantive and procedural due process was afforded 
to the Appellant throughout the proceedings. 
K. Mr. Augustus was provided with adequate notice, prior to 
termination or any loss of income, was provided with ample 
opportunity to prepare, and was afforded a pre-disciplinary 
hearing where he was represented by counsel. 
L. The Appellant was afforded an appeal at a time he 
stipulated to and during which he was ably represented by capable 
and effective legal counsel and was allowed to call all of the 
witnesses that he wished and to cross examine all of the 
witnesses called by the city. 
M. The Appellant was afforded the opportunity to submit any 
exhibits that he wished for consideration by the Hearing Board 
and to submit a brief on certain issues, which was carefully 
considered by the Board. 
N. From the evidence presented the Board has found a 
violation by the Appellant of the policies outlined in the 
notices and in the notice of termination. 
o. The meeting between Mr. Allred and Mr. Augustus was an 
appropriate exercise of supervisory responsibility by Mr. Allred 
and did not require the formalities appropriate for a· 
predisciplinary hearing. 
P. The application and imposition of paid vacation time was 
allowed pursuant to city policies section 5.01 . 010 and action 
5.01.060. 
Q. The conduct of Mr. Augustus ftt the meeting with his 
department head on January 21, 2016 was insubordinate. The 
capstone was his defiant refusal to remain in the meet ing when 
specifically and directly instructed twice to do so by his 
supervisor even when he was to l d that refusal t o remain would be 
insubordinat i on and may result in his termination, the comment as 
he walked out the door was "good luck wi th thatu. That was not, 
by any means , the only insubordination du r ing that meeting 
however . Listening to the recording of the meeting along with the 
transcript shows t hat the Appellant repeatedly refused to answer 
questions, was evasive , omitted facts, was d i s honest about facts 
and circumstances , demonstrated a defiant and hostile attitude 
towards his supervisor, refused to provide the video when 
requested to do so after finally acknowledging its existence, and 
constantl y and loudly tapped his pen on the desk during the 
conversation. Throughout that process the Department Head 
remained calm and did not raise his voice while the Appellant 
became hostile and agitated after being informed and with full 
knowledge that he was being recorded. Mr. Augustus never 
acknowledged any personal responsibility or fault or error on his 
part and continued to place all of the blame on Mr . Allred 
consistent with his apparent intentional design to undermine the 
authority of his department head . 
R. The facts do not suppor t a claim by the Appellant that he 
believed in good faith that he was entitled to leave the meeting . 
S. Consistent with state law and city policy, the only 
disciplinary actions which invoke due process protections are: 
dismissal , demotion or reduction in pay, suspension of over two 
days without pay, or transfer to a position with less 
remune r ation for disciplinary purposes. A meeting with the 
Department Head to discuss possible misconduct or a direction to 
take paid vacation time does not constitute formal discipline 
requiring approval of the City Manager for a predisciplinary 
hearing. 
T. The Board is not constrained strictly by the rules of 
evidence and procedure required in judicial proceedings and was 
intentionally very liberal in allowing the presentation of 
evidence, i ncluding belaboring certain issues and lines of 
questioning, so as to , within reason , allow the parties to 
present whatever evidence they wished. Based upon the stipulation 
of the parties t he Hearing Board also carefully studied all of 
the exhibits including the audio files provided and video clip in 
formulating its findings of fact in reaching its decision. 
Decision of the Appeals Board 
A. After hours of testimony at the hearing, additional hours 
of study of exhibits, and hours of deliberation, the Board 
• 
members each separately cast their ballots in. secret. The ballots 
were delivered to the Deputy City Recorder/Clerk of the Hearing 
who opened the envelopes in the presence of the Board and counted 
ballots. 
B. Ballot question number 1: Do the facts support the 
charges made by the Department head? 
Five (5) ballots were marked YES 
Zero (0) ballots were marked NO. 
C. Ballot question number 2: If you find that the employee 
violated one or more of the Vernal City policies stated in the 
termination notice did the City Manager abuse his discretion or 
exceed his authority in terminating the employee? 
Zero (0) ballots were marked YES 
Five (5) ballots were marked NO. 
D. The ballot instructed the Hearing Board members to 
consider the following instruction which was added pursuant to a 
request of the Appellant: 
To decide if the Appellant's discipline was 
unwarranted, or if the City Manager abused his 
discretion or exceeded his authority, consider: (1) 
when the violations of city policy are viewed as a 
whole, in light of all the circumstances, is the 
punishment disproportionate to the offenses such that 
the sanction of termination is unwarranted, and (2) has 
the Appellant demonstrated or shown that the sanction 
of termination is wholly inconsistent with sanctions 
imposed against other employees for similar misconduct? 
Hearing Board is that the 
Augustus, s warranted. The 
inati s sustained. 
E. The unanimous decision of the 
termination of the Appellant, Russell 
appea ·s denied, anf1)he order of 
~~---~=-=1-.P--~~~.\:-----=--ty Appeals Board 
Christian Kesselring, counsel 
for Appellant Russell Augustus 
Michael Harrington, counsel 
for Vernal City 
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R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
Utah Administrative Code 
Workforce Services 
Title R994. Workforce Information and Payment Services 
Rule R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits 
Current through Bulletin No. 2017-7, April 1, 2017 
R994-405 •-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge 
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in determining 
eligibility for benefits. 
(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established, benefits 
will be denied. 
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that further 
legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or 
that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be 
reasonable. If a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally 
has the responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging 
in conduct contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an opportunity to 
address those concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must provide 
appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply. 
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract or 
collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the 
discharge is consistent with the provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were 
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a 
claimant was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further 
violations may result in a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of itself, 
cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's 
ability to maintain necessary discipline. 
( e) Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior warning to 
support a disqualification. 
(2) Attendance Violations. 
(a) Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and 
productivity. It is the responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work 
within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for unjustified 
absence or tardiness is disqualifying if the claimant knew enforced attendance 
rules were being violated. A discharge for an attendance violation beyond the 
claimant's control is generally not disqualifying unless the claimant could 
reasonably have given notice or obtained permission consistent with the 
employer's rules, but failed to do so. 
(b) In cases of discharge for violations of attendance standards, the claimant's recent 
attendance history must be reviewed to determine if the violation is an isolated 
incident, or if it demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absence within the claimant's 
control. The flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a denial of 
benefits even if the last incident is beyond the claimant's control. 
(3) Falsification of Work Record. 
The duty of honesty is inherent in any employment relationship. An employee or potential 
employee has an obligation to truthfully answer material questions posed by the employer 
or potential employer. For purposes of this subsection, material questions are those that 
may expose the employer to possible loss, damage or litigation if answered falsely. If false 
statements were made as part of the application process, benefits may be denied 
regardless of whether the claimant would have been hired if all questions were answered 
truthfully. 
(4) Insubordination. 
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be followed; 
reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; supervisors will be 
respected and their authority will not be undermined. In determining when insubordination 
becomes disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and legitimate 
interests is of major importance. Protesting or expressing general dissatisfaction without 
an overt act is not a disregard of the employer's interests. However, provocative remarks 
to a superior or vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may constitute 
insubordination if it disrupts routine, undermines authority or impairs efficiency. Mere 
incompatibility or emphatic insistence or discussion by a claimant, acting in good faith, is 
not disqualifying conduct. 
(5) Loss of License. 
If the discharge is due to the loss of a required license and the claimant had control over 
the circumstances that resulted in the loss, the conduct is generally disqualifying. Harm is 
established as the employer would generally be exposed to an unacceptable degree of 
risk by allowing an employee to continue to work without a required license. In the 
example of a lost driving privilege due to driving under the influence (DUI), knowledge is 
established as it is understood by members of the driving public that driving under the 
influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and may be punishable by the loss of driving 
privileges. Control is established as the claimant made a decision to risk the loss of his or 
her license by failing to make other arrangements for transportation. 
(6) Incarceration. 
When a claimant engages in illegal activities, it must be recognized that the possibility of 
arrest and detention for some period of time exists. It is foreseeable that incarceration will 
result in absence from work and possible loss of employment. Generally, a discharge for 
failure to report to work because of incarceration due to proven or admitted criminal 
conduct is disqualifying. 
(7) Abuse of Drugs and Alcohol. 
(a) The Legislature, under the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, Section 34-38-1 et 
seq., has determined the illegal use of drugs and abuse of alcohol creates an 
unsafe and unproductive workplace. In balancing the interests of employees, 
employers and the welfare of the general public, the Legislature has determined 
the fair and equitable testing for drug and alcohol use is a reasonable employment 
policy. 
(b) An employer can establish a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under the 
Employment Security Act based on testing conducted under the Drug and Alcohol 
Testing Act by providing the following information: 
(i) A written policy on drug or alcohol testing consistent with the requirements 
of the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act and that was in place at the time the 
violation occurred. 
(ii) Reasonable proof and description of the method for communicating the 
policy to all employees, including a statement that violation of the policy 
may result in discharge. 
(iii) Proof of testing procedures used which would include: 
(A) Documentation of sample collection, storage and transportation 
procedures. 
(B) Documentation that the results of any screening test for drugs and 
alcohol were verified or confirmed by reliable testing methods. 
(C) A copy of the verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test report. 
(c) The above documentation shall be admissible as competent evidence under 
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence respecting "records of regularly conducted activity," unless determined 
otherwise by a court of law. 
(d) A positive alcohol test result shall be considered disqualifying if it shows a blood or 
breath alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater per 100 milliliters of blood or 
210 liters of breath. A blood or breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 
grams may also be disqualifying if the claimant worked in an occupation governed 
by a state or federal law that allowed or required discharge at a lower standard. 
( e) Proof of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result or refusal to 
provide a proper test sample is a violation of a reasonable employer rule. The 
claimant may be disqualified from the receipt of benefits if his or her separation 
was consistent with the employer's written drug and alcohol policy. 
(f) In addition to the drug and alcohol testing provisions above, ineligibility for benefits 
'-..ti under the Employment Security Act may be established through the introduction of 
other competent evidence. 
Cite as Utah Admin. Code R994-105-208 
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Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
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§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer - Appeals - Board -
Procedure 
( 1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended 
without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b} incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or 
heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee other than an employee described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is 
discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily 
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any disciplinary 
reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the final decision 
to discharge, suspendwithout pay, or involuntarily transfer to an appeal board or 
hearing officer established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall 
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to 
the appeal board or hearing officer. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the 
appeal with the municipal recorder in accordance with procedures established by a 
municipalitywithin 10 calendar days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal 
grievance procedure: or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder 
viJ 
shall refer a copy of a properly filed appeal to the appeal board or hearing 
officer described in Subsection (7). 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board or 
hearing officer shall schedule a hearing to take and receive evidence and 
fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the reasonfor the 
discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
(4) (a) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(b) 
(5) (a) 
(b) 
(6) (a) 
(i) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(ii) have a hearing open to the public; 
(iii) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(iv) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
An employee or the municipality may request the hearing described in Subsection 
(4 )(a)(ii). 
(i) A decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot. 
(ii) The appeal board or the hearing officer shall certify a decision by the appeal 
board or hearing officer, respectively, with the recorder no later than 15 
days after the day on which the hearing is held, except as provided in 
Subsection (5)(a)(iii). 
(iii) For good cause, the appeal board or hearing officer may extend the 15-day 
period under Subsection (S)(a)(ii) to a maximum of 60 calendar days, if the 
employee and municipality both consent. 
If the appeal board or hearing officer finds in favor of the employee, the appeal 
board or hearing officer shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged or suspended without pay less any amounts the employee 
earned from other employment during this period of time; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
A final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer may be reviewed by 
the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. 
(b) A petition under Subsection (6){a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of 
the final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be: 
(i) on the record of the appeal board or hearing officer; and 
(ii) for the purpose of determining if the appeal board or hearing officer abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing a hearing officer or the members of the 
appeal board, the number of members, the designation of a hearing officer's or 
appeal board member's term of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal 
and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each 
municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-
mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-mayor Form of Municipal 
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the 
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
(8) This section does not apply to an employee: 
(a) described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2); or 
(b) discharged or transferred to a position with less remuneration if the discharge or 
transfer is the result of a layoff, reorganization, or other non-disciplinary reason. 
Cite as Utah Code § 10-3-1106 
History. Amended by Chapter 321, 2012 General Session, §3, eff. 5/8/2012. 
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
Utah Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Title 5. General Provisions 
As amended through March 28, 2017 
Rule 24. Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings 
and in the order indicated: 
(a)( A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
1) judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case 
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a}( A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
2) 
(a)( A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
3) rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief 
where they are cited. 
(a)( A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
4) 
(a)( A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
5) standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
VJ) (a)( citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; 
5)( or 
A) 
(a}( a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the 
5)( trial court. 
B) 
(a)( Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
6) interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal 
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the 
provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set 
forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11} of this rule. 
(a}( A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
7) case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement 
of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements 
of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record in accordance with paragraph (e} of this rule. 
(a)( Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall 
8} be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. 
It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is 
arranged. 
(a}( An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
9) appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking 
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)( A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
10) 
(a)( An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
11) under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, 
the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a 
copy of: 
(a)( any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
11) cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(A) 
(a)( in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appe~ls 
11) opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal 
(B) but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)( those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
11} determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
(C) fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b} Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b )( a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
1) statement of the appellant; or 
(b)( an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
2) appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No 
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
{d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" 
and 11appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the 
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee, 11 "the injured person,' "the taxpayer, 11 etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or 11 (g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right 
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or 
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. 
(f)( 1 Type-volume limitation. 
) (f)( In an appeal involving the legality of a death sentence, a principal brief is 
1 )( acceptable if it contains no more than 28,000 words or if it uses a 
A) monospaced face and 86 contains no more than 2,600 lines of text; and a 
reply brief is acceptable if it contains no 87 more than 14,000 words or if it 
uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 88 1,300 lines of text. 
In all other appeals, a principal brief is acceptable if it contains no more than 
14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 
1,300 lines of text; and a reply brief is acceptable if it contains no more than 
7,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 650 
lines of text. 
(f)( Headings, footnotes and quotations count toward the word and line 
1 )( 
B) 
limitations, but the table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations or portions of the record as required 
by paragraph (a) of this rule do not count toward the word and line 
limitations. 
(f)( Certificate of compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(f)(1) must 
1 )( include a certificate by the attorney or an unrepresented party that the brief 
C) complies with the type-volume limitation. The person preparing the 
certificate may rely on the word or line count of the word processing system 
used to prepare the brief. The certificate must state either the number of 
words in the brief or the number of lines of monospaced type in the brief. 
(f)(2 Page limitation. Unless a brief complies with Rule 24(f)(1 ), a principal briefs shall 
) not exceed 30 pages, and a reply briefs shall not exceed 15 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. 
In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of 
briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. 
(g)( The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
1) the appeal. 
{g)( The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-
2) Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and 
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)( The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
3) Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief 
of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)( The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to 
4) the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(g)( Type-volume limitation. 
5) (g)( The appellant's Brief of Appellant is acceptable if it contains no more than 
5)( 14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 
A) 1,300 lines of text. 
~ 
(g)( 
5)( 
B) 
(g)( 
5)( 
C) 
(g)( 
5)( 
D) 
The appellee's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it 
contains no more than 16,500 words or it uses a monospaced face and 
contains no more than 1,500 lines of text. 
The appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee is 
acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it uses a 
monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text. 
The appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it contains no 
more than half of the type volume specified in Rule 24(g)(5)(A). 
(g)( Certificate of Compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(g)(5) must comply 
6) with Rule 24(f)(1 )(C). 
(g)( Page Limitation. Unless it complies with Rule 24(g)(5) and (6), the appellant's 
7) Brief of Appellant must not exceed 30 pages; the appellee's Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 35 pages; the appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, 30 pages; and the appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, 15 
pages. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the page, word, 
or line limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be 
briefed, the number of additional pages, words, or lines requested, and the good cause for 
granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days prior to the date the brief is due or 
seeking three or fewer additional pages, 1,400 or fewer additional words, or 130 or fewer 
lines of text need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed within seven 
days of the date the brief is due and seeking more than three additional pages, 1,400 
additional words, or 130 lines of text shall be accompanied by a copy of the finished brief. 
If the motion is granted, the responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional 
pages, words, or lines without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or 
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more 
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, 
any number of either may join in a single brief. and any appellant or appellee may adopt 
by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
0) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but 
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter 
setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There 
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The 
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within seven 
days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded 
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
Cite as Utah. R. App. P. 24 
Note: 
Advisory Committee Notes 
The rule reflects the marshaling requirement articulated in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, which holds 
that the failure to marshal is no longer a technical deficiency that will result in default, but is the manner in which an 
appellant carries its burden of persuasion when challenging a finding or verdict based upon evidence. 
Briefs that do not comply with the technical requirements of this rule are subject to Rule 27(e). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation 
of supporting authority. 
Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.010 Purpose. 
The purpose of annual vacation leave is to allow an employee time to both 
mentally and physically refresh himself in order that he be better able to carry out 
the duties of his work. To achieve this goal, it is the intent of Vernal City to have 
the employees schedule annual vacation leave during the course of his 
employment. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.060 Scheduling. 
An employee's vacation shall be, as much as possible, scheduled for the 
employee's convenience. However, vacations must be scheduled through 
Department Heads so as not to interfere seriously with or impair departmental 
efficiency. All employees shall submit Request for Leave forms before taking any 
vacation. As he deems necessary, a Department Head may require an employee 
to use any accrued vacation leave. (Form in appendix pages) (Amended 
11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.030 Causes for 
Disciplinary Action. 
An employee holding any position with Vernal City may be placed on 
probationary status, transferred, demoted, reduced in pay, suspended with or 
without pay, or terminated, for any of the following reasons including, but are not 
limited to the following: 
A. A violation of any of the City Personnel policies and procedures, or any 
other administrative policies, as adopted by resolution of the Vernal City 
Council; 
B. Neglect of duty; 
C. Refusal to obey a reasonable order by any supervisor, either written or 
verbal; 
D. Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties; 
E. An act hostile to public service; 
F. Falsification or unauthorized alteration of City records; 
G. Falsification of employment application; 
H. Knowingly marking the time sheet of another employee, authorizing 
one's time sheet to be marked by an unauthorized employee, or 
unauthorized alteration of a time sheet. 
I. Carelessness which affects the safety of personnel; 
J. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with fellow 
employees on the job, or the public. 
K. Theft or removal from the work area or premise without proper 
authorization of any City property or that of any employee. 
L. Gambling or engaging a lottery at any City work area. 
M. Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of 
any employee. 
N. Deliberately restricting output. 
0. Possessing or consuming any alcoholic beverage or unlawfully 
manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing or using a controlled 
substance in the workplace of Vernal City. 
P. Intoxication, or being under the influence of alcohol or prohibitive 
drugs, during work hours or in the workplace of Vernal City. 
Q. Immoral conduct or indecency affecting job performance or job 
effectiveness. 
R. Sleeping on the job during work hours. 
S. Engaging in conduct that negatively impacts the employee's ability to 
perform essential functions of his job. 
T. Using, threatening or attempting to use personal or political influence in 
an effort to secure special consideration as a City employee. 
U. Failure to report to work without notification to the Department Head 
unless it is impossible to give such notice. 
V. Involvement in a vehicular accident involving a City vehicle, where 
negligence has been demonstrated by the employee. 
W. Act of dishonesty related to job performance. 
X. Misuse of disposed surplus property. 
Y. Sexual harassment of employees. 
Z. Using profane language. 
AA. Displaying insubordinate behavior. 
BB. Any other misconduct. 
CC. Possession of firearms, weapons or explosives on City owned 
property or at the work location without authorization of the City Manager 
unless specifically allowed by federal or State law. 
DD. Employment discrimination. 
EE. Moving traffic violation while operating a City vehicle. 
FF. Violation of the Information Technology Resources provisions of 
these policies and procedures. 
GG. Violation of local, State or Federal laws. 
(Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
(Res. 2015-03, Amended, 02/04/2015, Prior Text; Res. 2010-14, Amended, 
07/08/2010, Prior Text; Res. 2009-28, Amended, 12/17/2009, Prior Text; Res. 
2005-19, Amended, 11/02/2005, Prior Text) 
Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.040 Legal and 
management review required for formal disciplinary action. 
A. Whenever any Department Head, or his designee, feels there is a need for 
formal disciplinary action to be taken against a City employee, that Department 
Head must contact the City Manager's office prior to taking any other action. 
B. A meeting will be held with the Department Head and appropriate 
members of his / her department to discuss the action of the employee and the 
proposed disciplinary action to be taken in response. 
C. Excepting for oral warnings or written reprimands, the City Manager shall 
approve all other disciplinary actions of any employee as provided in Section 
12.05.01oand 12.05.060 of this Chapter. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
(Res. 2012-10, Amended, 05/16/2012, Prior Text; Res. 2005-19, Amended, 
11/02/2005, Prior Text) 
Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.065 Types of disciplinary 
action. 
A. Informal disciplinacy procedures can include the following: 
1. Oral warning. Whenever grounds for disciplinary action exist, and the 
department head determines that more severe action is not immediately 
necessary, the deficiency demonstrated may be orally communicated to the 
employee. 
a. A memorandum of the date and content of the oral warning shall be 
written by the department head, or designee. 
b. This memorandum shall be placed in a separate verbal warning folder in 
the personnel department and is not part of the employee's personnel file. 
2. Written reprimand. The department head, or designee, may reprimand 
employees for employment pedormance related reasons. 
a. The department head, or designee, shall furnish the employee with an 
employee written reprimand notification setting for the reasons. 
b. A copy of the employee written reprimand notification, signed by the 
department head, or designee, and the employee, shall be sent to the personnel 
department and be placed in the employee's personnel file. If the employee 
refuses to sign the form, the department head, or designee, will so state. 
B. Formal disciplinary procedures can include the following: 
1. Placement on probation. The department head, or his designee, after 
approval of the City Manager, may place an employee on a disciplinary probation 
status for a time period not to exceed a six ( 6) month period. 
2. Suspension. The department head, or designee, after consultation with 
the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter 
pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may suspend employees with or 
without pay. 
3. Demotion or reduction in pay in the same grade. If in the best interest of 
both the employee and the City, the department head, or designee, after 
consultation with the City Manager and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may demote or reduce in 
the same grade, employees for employment pedormance related reasons. 
4. Transfer which may result in reduction in pay. If in the best interest of 
both the employee and the City, the department head, or designee, after 
consultation with the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may transfer employees, 
except a probationary employee, by furnishing the employee with written 
employee transfer notification. 
5. Termination. The department head, or designee, after consultation with 
the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter 
pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may request to terminate an 
employee. Only the City Manager may approve the termination of an employee. 
(Res. 2005-19, Add, 11/02/2005) 
